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A Reply to My Critics 
ROBERT STERN 
University of Sheffield, UK 
 
First of all, I would like to thank my commentators for the generosity of their 
remarks, and also the trouble they have taken in thinking critically about my work; 
they all raise significant points, which I will now do my best to address.i 
 
Reply to Anne Margaret Baxley 
Baxley focuses her remarks on my discussion of Kant, and raises two problems for it: 
First, while the distinction I point to between the human and the holy will has some 
interest, it is not actually as centrally significant in solving the problem of moral 
REOLJDWLRQDV,VXJJHVWDQGWKHUHIRUHGRHVQ¶WKROGWKHUHDONH\WR6HFWLRQ,,,RIWKH
Groundwork. Second, the textual evidence that I offer in support of my claim that 
Kant is a value realist is inadequate. I will deal with each criticism in turn. 
 
(a) The problem of moral obligation 
%D[OH\DFFHSWVWKDWP\DFFRXQWRI.DQW¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHKXPDQDQGWKHKRO\
will is useful in relation to one question concerning moral oblLJDWLRQQDPHO\³:KDW
accounts for the fact that moral laws necessarily take the form of obligations or duties 
DQGWKHUHIRUHLQYROYHVRPHIHHOLQJRIFRQVWUDLQWIRUILQLWHUDWLRQDOEHLQJV"´ZKLFK
she takes to be a phenomenological question (Baxley MS: 5-6). However, she thinks 
there is a second, and rather more pressing, question which I fail to appreciate, 
perhaps because I confuse it with the first, which concerns not the phenomenology 
but the authority RIPRUDOLW\³:KDWDFFRXQWVIRUWKHIDFWWKDWPRUal laws are 
obligatory or binding for all rational agents independently of any contingent facts 
DERXWWKHLUSDUWLFXODUIHHOLQJVGHVLUHVDQGLQWHUHVWV"´%D[OH\06RUDVVKHDOVR
SXWVLW³:K\>VKRXOGZH@WDNHPRUDOQRUPVWREHVXSUHPHO\DXWKRULWDWLYe laws 
governing the conduct of all rational agents, norms that outweigh or override all other 
norms based on our non-PRUDOLQWHUHVWV"´%D[OH\06%D[OH\KROGVWKDWP\
IRFXVRQWKHKXPDQKRO\ZLOOGLVWLQFWLRQPHDQV,KDYHQ¶WGHDOWSURSHUO\ZLWKWKLV
sHFRQGLVVXHDQGKDYHUXQWKHWZRWRJHWKHU³%XWWKHGLVWLQFWLRQ>EHWZHHQWKHKRO\
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and human wills] does not resolve the fundamental issue about the obligatoriness of 
morality, for this requires providing an account of the authority of moral laws that 
explains how being obligated by unconditional practical laws does not result in 
KHWHURQRP\RUUHGXFHPRUDOODZVWRK\SRWKHWLFDOLPSHUDWLYHV´%D[OH\06 
 Moreover, Baxley thinks that because I conflate these two questions, I am 
mistaken in my understanding of Section III of the Groundwork, and how this is 
VXSSRVHGWRUHVROYHWKHZRUU\RIZKHWKHURUQRWPRUDOLW\LVD³SKDQWRP´RU
³FKLPHULFDOLGHD´)RUVKHWDNHVWKLVZRUU\WRIXQGDPHQWDOO\FRQFHUQZKHWKHURUQRW
we are autonomous, where the transcendental distinction that Kant draws between the 
intelligible and empirical self is really meant to resolve this question, not the problem 
of obligation as I conceive it, with the former aspect of the self as supposedly 
constraining the latter. 
 In general, therefoUH%D[OH\¶VIXQGDPHQWDOREMHFWLRQLVWKDWP\FRQFHSWLRQRI
.DQW¶VWUDQVFHQGHQWDOTXHVWLRQWKDWLVGHDOWZLWKLQ6HFWLRQ,,,QDPHO\WKHTXHVWLRQ
³+RZLVDFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHSRVVLEOH"´LVRYHUO\QDUURZLWOHDYHVRXWWKHZRUU\
about autonomy, and just deals with the phenomenological aspect of such 
LPSHUDWLYHVEXWQRWZKDWPDNHVWKHPDXWKRULWDWLYH+DYLQJVXPPDUL]HG%D[OH\¶V
critique on this score, let me now make some points in response. 
 First of all, I agree with Baxley that Kant is concerned that if we lack 
autonomy, then morality is a chimera, and that part of the point of his transcendental 
distinction between our phenomenal and noumenal selves is to help resolve this 
problem (cf. Stern 2010, esp p. 464); and I also agree that focusing on the holy/human 
will distinction is not directly relevant to this issue. However, where I differ from 
%D[OH\LVLQWKHIDFWWKDW,VHHWKH³+RZLVDFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHSRVVLEOH"´
question as raised in Section III to be narrower than this issue; for I think that when 
Kant addresses this question, he is taking it that the problem of autonomy has already 
EHHQUHVROYHG0\UHDGLQJWKHUHIRUHFRUUHVSRQGVWRZKDWLVVRPHWLPHVFDOOHGD³WZR
GHGXFWLRQV´DFFRXQWRIGroundwork III, the first running from 4:446-53 and the 
second from 4:453-55, where in the first Kant claims to have already dealt with the 
³FLUFOH´WKDWPD\KDYHOHGXVWRGRXEWWKDWZHFDQUHDVRQDEO\WDNHRXUVHOYHVWREH
DXWRQRPRXVZKLOHWKHVHFRQGLVZKHUHWKH³+RZSRVVLEOH"´TXHVWLRQFRPHVWREH
answered, and which therefore arises even after the question of autonomy has been 
VHWWOHG7KXV,WKLQN,FDQUHDVRQDEO\FODLPWRKDYHDGGUHVVHG.DQW¶V³+RZ
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SRVVLEOH"´TXHVWLRQHYHQLI,KDYHQRWDGGUHVVHGWKHSUREOHPRIDXWRQRP\DV.DQW
himself seems to keep these issues separate. 
 +RZHYHU%D[OH\PLJKWUHDVRQDEO\VD\WKDWWKLVGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\JHWWRWKHKHDUW
RIKHUZRUU\)RUVKHPLJKWDUJXHHYHQZKHQLWFRPHWRWKHQDUURZHU³+RZ
SRVVLEOH"´TXHVWLRQ,KDYHVWLOORQO\VKRZQKRZ.DQWGHDOVZLWKone aspect of this 
question in focusing on the holy/human will distinction ± namely, the 
phenomenological aspect, not the authoritative one. 
 Now, of course, I certainly do think there is a phenomenological aspect to the 
problem of moral obligation, and this was one side of the issue I was keen to bring 
out. But as I tried to make clear when discussing the problem of moral obligation 
generally (Stern 2012: 45-48), I also take seriously other aspects of the problem too, 
where these two go hand-in-hand: in feeling constrained, we hereby take it that a 
legitimate authority is being exercised over us, as otherwise we would dismiss the 
feeling as merely pathological. The issue is, therefore, whether my emphasis on the 
holy/human will distinction in Kant illuminates or obscures this issue? 
 In fact, I would argue, the very question of authority depends on it. For, just as 
the holy will could not undergo the experience of moral necessitation, so it could not 
raise the worry of whether it should accept the authority of moral reason over its non-
moral interests, as it has no such interests, so in this sense its moral reason exercises 
no such authority, as there is nothing over which it stands in any authority, as the 
hierarchical relation this requires does not here apply. Just raising the issue for Kant, 
therefore, already relies on the distinction. Moreover, as I claim in the book (Stern 
2012: 103-4), I think the hybrid account of Kant that I present explains the source of 
the authority of reason over the subject, based on its capacity to inform us of the 
moral law, and to hold us to it. This account does more than just explain the felt 
burdensomeness of the moral law, therefore; it also explains why we take it that the 
burden it imposes on us is to be accepted as a legitimate one. 
 The value in this approach can be seen, I think, if we consider the problem that 
Kant raises at the beginning of the sub-VHFWLRQ³2IWKH,QWHUHVWWKDW$WWDFKHVWRWKH
,GHDVRI0RUDOLW\´.DQWE-50). In the third paragraph, Kant says that even 
if Sections I and II of the Groundwork have achieved their stated aim of successfully 
LGHQWLI\LQJWKHVXSUHPHSULQFLSOHRIPRUDOLW\QRQHWKHOHVV³ZLWKUHJDUGWRLWVYDOLGLW\
and the practical necessity of subjecting oneself to it, we would have got no further´
Why does Kant think this is so? He writes: 
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[F]or if someone were to ask us why the universal validity of our maxim, as a 
law, must be the limiting condition of our actions, and on what we found the 
worth we assign to this way of acting, which is to be so great that there can be 
no higher interest at all, and how it can be that a human being believes that he 
feels his person worth in virtue of this alone, compared to which that of an 
agreeable or disagreeable condition should be taken for nothing, we would not 
EHDEOHWRJLYHKLPDVDWLVIDFWRU\DQVZHU«>:@HFDQQRW\HWFRPHWR
VHH«>KRZZHFDQ@ILQGPHUHO\LQRXURZQSHUVRQDZRUWKWKDWFDQPDNHJRRG
to us the loss of everything that obtains a worth for our condition ± or how this 
is possible, and hence whence the moral law is binding. (Kant 1786b: 4:449-
50) 
7KLV,WKLQNLVWKHQDUURZ³+RZLVDFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHSRVVLEOH"´TXHVWLRQWKDW
then comes to be addressed in the section with that title. I think the answer to the 
TXHVWLRQWKHUHWXUQVRQ.DQW¶VXse of the holy/human will distinction to show why the 
moral law takes a binding form for us, where once that is understood, it will also 
show why that bindingness is something we are willing to acknowledge as legitimate. 
 Here is part of the relevant discussion that Baxley cites, where Kant concludes 
KLVDQVZHUWRWKHWUDQVFHQGHQWDO³+RZSRVVLEOH"´TXHVWLRQ 
And thus categorical imperatives are possible, because the idea of freedom 
makes me a member of an intelligible world, in virtue of which, if I were that 
alone [cf. a holy will], all my actions would always conform with the 
autonomy of the will, but as at the same time I intuit myself as a member of 
the world of sense [cf. a human will], they ought to conform with it; and this 
categorical ought represents a synthetic proposition a priori, because to my 
will affected by sensuous desires there is added the idea of the same will, but 
belonging to the world of the understanding, pure and practical by itself, 
which contains the supreme condition of the former according to reason«7KH
practical use of common human reason confirms the correctness of this 
deduction. There is no one, not even the most hardened scoundrel, if only he is 
RWKHUZLVHLQWKHKDELWRIXVLQJUHDVRQZKR«GRHVQRWZLVKWKDWKHWRRPLJKW
be so disposed. But he cannot easily bring this about in himself, just because 
of his inclinations and impulses; while at the same time he wishes to be free 
IURPVXFKLQFOLQDWLRQVZKLFKKHKLPVHOIILQGVEXUGHQVRPH«>)@URPWKDWZLVK
he can expect no gratificatioQRIKLVGHVLUHV«EXWRQO\DJUHDWHULQQHUZRUWKRI
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KLVSHUVRQ«7KHPRUDORXJKWLVWKXVRQH¶VRZQQHFHVVDU\ZLOOLQJDVDPHPEHU
of an intelligible world, and he thinks of it as an ought only in so far as he 
considers himself at the same time as a member of the world of sense. (Kant 
1786b: 4:454-455) 
Baxley and I disagree about how best to understand this passage. For Baxley, it is 
meant to answer the problem of autonomy, and as the holy/human will distinction 
cannot offer any such answer, it is not central to the passage.ii Now, I agree with 
Baxley that this distinction is not sufficient to answer the problem of autonomy; but 
on the other hand, I think (as I said above) that this problem has been answered by 
this stage in the text, and so is not what is going on here. Rather, I would argue, Kant 
is here showing that the moral law takes a binding form for us because we are human 
not holy wills; and that because what binds us is our rational natures in compelling us 
to follow the moral law, we can see how it comes to be authoritative for us, as in 
conforming to such authority, we are hereby following our higher selves ± as even the 
³KDUGHQHGVFRXQGUHO´LVDZDUH,WKHUHIRUHWKLQNWKHKRO\KXPDQZLOOGLVWLQFWLRQFDQ
do more work than Baxley allows, even if it cannot deal with all the problems that 
Kant is addressing in Section III of the Groundwork. 
 Finally, however, Baxley may still feel that I have not addressed the real 
problem that she is raising: namely, as autonomous agents, a law can only be 
authoritative for us, if we have authored the law itself, not merely bound ourselves to 
it. But if this is the worry, I do not really see it: for why, in order for reason to be 
authoritative, must the principle that it binds us to follow be something that it itself 
lays down or constructs? Behind this concern, of course, may be a worry about 
autonomy: the concern might be that unless reason also authors the law to which it 
binds us, we cannot really be free. However, as I argue in the book, it seems to me 
WKDWIURP.DQW¶VSerspective, we are autonomous as long as we are the source of the 
ODZ¶VREOLJDWRU\DQGKHQFHELQGLQJIRUFHZHGRQ¶WDOVRKDYHWRauthor the law itself 
in a constructivist manner, to see it as authoritative in a way that is compatible with 
our autonomy. And in the book, I also point to passages where Kant himself seems to 
say as much (cf. Stern 2012: 34). 
 
(b) Value realism 
,QRZWXUQWRWKHVHFRQGRI%D[OH\¶VFULWLFDOFRQFHUQVZKLFKFHQWUHVRQP\FODLPWKDW
Kant was a value realist, and not a constructivist. In the book, I give three pieces of 
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evidence to suggest that this was the case: One of these is the passage we have just 
discussed, concerning the special value of moral agency that even the scoundrel can 
DSSUHFLDWHEXW%D[OH\GRHVQ¶WGHDOZLWKWKLVPDWHULDOQRWLQJWKDWWKLVSDUWRI.DQW¶V
WH[WLV³QRWRULRXVO\RSDTXH´VRSHUKDSVEHVWDYRLGHG%D[OH\06QRWH,ZLOO
therefore follow Baxley in passing over it. The other two pieces of evidence which I 
cite and which she does discuss concern firstO\.DQW¶VFODLPDERXWWKHYDOXHRIWKH
good will at the outset of the Groundwork, and his claim about the unconditional 
value of rational beings which is made during his derivation of the Formula of 
Humanity in Section II. Following Baxley, I will consider each in turn. 
 The first place where Kant appears to argue as a value realist on my account, 
LVZKHUHKHZULWHV³,WLVLPSRVVLEOHWRWKLQNRIDQ\WKLQJDWDOOLQWKHZRUOGRULQGHHG
even beyond it, that could be taken to be good without limitation, except a good will´
(Kant 1786b: 4:393). But Baxley disagrees: rather, she thinks Kant is merely claiming 
that as rational agents we attribute a special value to a pure and good will, valuing it 
above talents, gifts of fortune, happiness and so on ± but Kant can be making this 
FODLPZLWKRXWVD\LQJWKDWWKLVYDOXHLV³VRPHREMHFWLYHPRUDOSURSHUW\WKDWUHVLGHVLQ
LWDQGLVQRWFRQVWUXFWHG´%D[OH\065DWKHUWKDQVSHDNLQJLQIDYRXURIPRUDO
realism, therefore, Baxley takes this discussion of the good will to be neutral on such 
meta-ethical matters: it is merely telling us about the kind of value that common 
moral opinion attaches to a will of this sort, but not whether it possesses that value in 
a realist or a constructivist manner. 
 Now, Baxley is of course right that at the outset of the Groundwork, Kant is 
IROORZLQJZKDWKHWDNHVWREH³FRPPRQPRUDOUDWLRQDOFRJQLWLRQ´FI.DQWE
4:393), as a way of getting to the supreme principle of morality, so to that extent he is 
merely telling us here what such ³PRUDOUDWLRQDOFRJQLWLRQ´WDNHVWREH
XQFRQGLWLRQDOO\YDOXDEOHQDPHO\WKHJRRGZLOO$QGZKLOH.DQWGRHVQ¶WVHHPWRKHUH
offer a constructivist account of that value, Baxley might perhaps be right to argue 
that it is too early in the Groundwork to attribute to Kant any commitment one way or 
the other to realism or constructivism, as he is simply trying to capture what it is that 
we take to possess such value, not how we should conceive of it in meta-ethical terms. 
 But, later in the Groundwork, when Kant comes back to talking about the 
good will, he does offer a more philosophical account of what explains its goodness 
and thus its value, namely, that it is determined to act by the moral law. Thus, he 
ZULWHVWRZDUGVWKHHQGRI6HFWLRQ,³%XWZKDWNLQGRIlaw can that possibly be, the 
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representation of which ± even without regard for the effect to be expected from it ± 
PXVWGHWHUPLQHWKHZLOOIRULWWREHFDOOHGJRRGDEVROXWHO\DQGZLWKRXWOLPLWDWLRQ"´
(Kant 1786b 4:402), while in Section II he returns to tKHWRSLF³:HFDQQRZHQG
where we set out from at the beginning, namely with the concept of an 
unconditionally good will. A will is absolutely good that cannot be evil, hence whose 
PD[LPLIPDGHDXQLYHUVDOODZFDQQHYHUFRQIOLFWZLWKLWVHOI´.DQWb 4:437).iii 
Now here, it seems, we get an account of the value of the good will that does not take 
DFRQVWUXFWLYLVWIRUPRIVRPHWKLQJZHPXVW³FRQIHU´RQLWTXDUDWLRQDODJHQWVUDWKHU
its value is said to reside in its conformity with the moral law, which is what makes it 
good, independent of any such constructivist procedure. It would therefore appear that 
when Kant comes to give his account of the value of the good will later in the 
Groundwork, his approach is a realist one. 
 However, of course, the constructivist may well be unconvinced by this 
suggestion, as they will take it that the moral law is itself something that is 
constructed, so that ultimately this value of the good will itself rest on a foundation 
that fits with the constructivist picture. But as I have already mentioned, and as others 
have emphasized, Kant seems to explicitly reject the idea that the moral law has an 
author, and thus to repudiate the model on which the constructivist picture is built. If 
this is right, therefore, it would seHPWKDWDIWHUDOO.DQW¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKHJRRGZLOOLV
a reasonable candidate to offer in support of his realism about value. 
 We may now turn to the second piece of evidence that I discuss and which 
Baxley questions, which concerns the value of humanity, where I suggest that Kant 
treats the absolute worth of rational beings as the ground for the Formula of 
+XPDQLW\³6RDFWWKDW\RXXVHKXPDQLW\ZKHWKHULQ\RXURZQSHUVRQDVZHOODVLQ
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never mereO\DVDPHDQV´
(Kant 1786b 4:429). My claim is that Kant argues that rational beings have this value 
after using an argument from elimination against other possible candidates: (i) objects 
of inclination, (ii) inclinations themselves, and (iii) non-rational beings produced by 
nature, such as animals.iv %XW%D[OH\LVQRWFRQYLQFHGWKDWWKLVLVDOOWKDW.DQW¶V
SRVLWLRQDPRXQWVWRVKHFODLPVWKDWDIWHU.DQW¶VDUJXPHQWIURPHOLPLQDWLRQLQ
4:428.7-428.33, there is a further argument in the next paragraph (428.34-429.14), 
which tells in favour a more constructivist reading. 
 Here is the relevant part of that second paragraph: 
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The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. The 
human being [der Mensch] necessarily represents his own existence in this 
way; to that extent it is thus a subjective principle of human actions. But every 
other rational being also represents its existence in this way, as a consequence 
of just the same rational ground that also holds for me [Footnote: Here I put 
forward this proposition as a postulate. The grounds for it will be found in the 
final section]; thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as 
a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. 
(Kant 1786b: 4:429)v  
$QGKHUHLV%D[OH\¶VFRQVWUXFWLYLVWUHDGLQJRIWKLVSDUDJUDSK 
[T]he evidence weighs in favor of constructivism, because that humanity has 
absolute value seems to derive from some fact about how we are constrained 
to think of ourselves as rationaODJHQWV«:KDWLVPRVWQRWDEOHDERXWWKLV
DUJXPHQWLVWKHZD\WKHDUJXPHQWGHSHQGVRQ.DQW¶VFRUHSUHPLVHWKDWD
rational being necessarily represents his own existence as an end in itself, 
ZKLFKKHFRQVLGHUVDVXEMHFWLYHSULQFLSOHRIDFWLRQ«.DQW¶VFODLPLV that 
WKLQNLQJRIRQH¶VH[LVWHQFHDVDHQGLQLWVHOILVnecessarily something each of 
us does. Although he offers no direct explanation for this claim that we must 
regard ourselves as ends in ourselves possessing absolute value, Kant includes 
a footnote to this proposition, noting that there are rational grounds for 
attributing this status to ourselves. Specifically, he claims that those rational 
grounds give every other rational being the same reason for representing her 
existence this way, and that those rational grounds are to be found in 
Groundwork III. In short, Kant himself indicates that the central premise in his 
official argument for the Formula of Humanity amounts to the claim that a 
human being necessarily conceives of herself as an end in itself insofar as she 
is rational, and that the answer as to why we are constrained by our agency to 
regard ourselves this way can be found in the final section of the Groundwork. 
(Baxley MS: 17-18)  
In taking the paragraph this way, Baxley is broadly following the approach of other 
constructivist readers, such as Korsgaard and others. 
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 +RZHYHU,UHDG.DQW¶VSRVLWLRQKHUHYHU\GLIIHUHQWO\vi )LUVWRIDOO,GRQ¶W
think Kant is offering a second, separate argument for the value of humanity, in 
addition to and separate from the argument from elimination given in the previous 
paragraph; rather, I think all this second paragraph is doing is summing up where 
things stand, given that argument ± namely, if we are to take there to be a categorical 
imperative at all, we must allow that human beings qua rational agents have the kind 
of value that means they should be treated as ends valid for themselves and other 
rational agents, and thus as ends in themselves. On my account, therefore, from what 
has already been established in the first paragraph, Kant thinks he is entitled to assert 
WKDW³KXPDQEHLQJVQHFHVVDULO\UHSUHVHQWWKHLUH[LVWHQFH´DVDQHQGLQLWVHOIJLYHQWKH
argument above, which has shown that it is in our status as rational creatures (not 
merely natural ones) in which our value resides. So, I would hold that this necessity 
FODLPLVQ¶WDFODLPDERXW³KRZZHDUHFRQVWUDLQHGE\RXUDJHQF\WRUHJDUGRXUVHOYHV´
in a constructivist manner, where this constraint is meant to confer value on what is so 
regarded; rather, it is just a conclusion we must rationally accept about what has 
value, give the force of the argument from elimination in the previous paragraph. 
 %XWVWLOOLWPLJKWEHVDLGZK\GRHV.DQWFDOOLVD³subjective principle of 
KXPDQDFWLRQ´")RU%D[OH\DQGthe constructivist, this shows that Kant is taking it to 
be the way in which each of us is forced to represent our own existence, as being an 
HQGLQLWVHOI+RZHYHUDJDLQ,WDNH.DQW¶VSRVLWLRQKHUHYHU\GLIIHUHQWO\2QP\
account, Kant calls the principlH³VXEMHFWLYH´EHFDXVHWKHUHLVDJDSLQKLVDUJXPHQW
from elimination, as not all rational creatures (such as God) are produced by nature, 
so that it may be that in their case, their value may be held to reside in some other 
feature that differentiates thHPIURPSHUVRQVIRUH[DPSOHLQ*RG¶VFDVHKLV
omnipotence), where for Kant the worry is that for them they may therefore be held to 
relate to the moral law in a way that is different from us, thus endangering its 
necessity and universality and so rendering it subjective rather than objective ± 
namely, something that applies to us, but not all rational creatures. At this point, 
however, Kant admits in a footnote that he has not blocked this lacuna in his 
argument, and defers his answer to Section III of the Groundwork, where he will say 
more about what it is about rational nature that gives us our value (not merely that it 
is this nature which does so), where once this is clear, it will also be clear why it is 
this that gives value to other rational beings such as God. For the moment, Kant can 
therefore only assert as a postulate to be supported later, that ³every other rational 
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being [including God] also represents its existence [as an end] in this way, as a 
consequence of just the same rational ground [i.e. the value of rational nature] that 
also KROGVIRUPH>TXDKXPDQEHLQJ@´. Granted this assumption, Kant therefore 
asserts that this is an objective principle holding for all rational beings, from which 
the Formula of Humanity therefore follows. I would therefore argue that this 
GLVFXVVLRQUHODWHVWR.DQW¶VUHPDUNVLQKLVConjectural Beginning of Human History, 
which parallels this part of the Groundwork to a considerable degree. Kant takes as 
his text here Genesis 3:22, which he interprets as God saying that through his ability 
to know good and evil, and this his difference from the animals which this rational 
FDSDFLW\LPSOLHV³0DQKDVEHFRPHOLNHXV´DQGVRHTXDOLQPRUDOVWDWXVWR*RG
KLPVHOIQRPDWWHUKRZVXSHULRUVXFK³KLJKHUEHLQJV´PD\EHLQWKHLU other abilities 
(cf. Kant 1786a: 8:114-5). 
 There is then, clearly, a significant difference between my reading of this 
account of the value of humanity in the Groundwork, and that offered by Baxley and 
other constructivists. The difference can be highlighted by looking again at these 
crucial sentences from the second paragraph: 
 
The human being [der Mensch] necessarily represents his own existence in 
this way; to that extent it is thus a subjective principle of human actions. But 
every other rational being also represents its existence in this way, as a 
consequence of just the same rational ground that also holds for me. 
 
On my account, the crucial issue here is that while we as human beings must see our 
rational natures as constituting our status as ends given that we accept that there is a 
categorical imperative that holds of the human will, it is not yet clear that any rational 
being (such as God) must see this as constituting that status for them, or whether they 
could reasonably take that status to be based on some other feature that we possess 
but which they do not. The constructivist, however, takes the first of the sentences 
above to relate to an individual human being, who is said to have to take his or her 
own particular existence as an end; and then reads the second sentence as claiming 
that every other individual human being will likewise have to do the same concerning 
their  existence, so making it an objective rather than a subjective principle. 
But this fudges what seems to be the crucial contrast drawn in sentences one 
and two, which is not between how the individual must represent him/herself versus 
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how all individuals represent themselves, but how human beings as a class [der 
Mensch] must represent themselves and how rational beings more generally must so 
represent themselves. Of FRXUVHLWPLJKWEHVDLGWKDW³PH´DWWKHHQGRIVHQWHQFHWZR
suggests otherwisHEXW³PH´KHUHFDQDOVRUHIHUWR³PH´TXDKXPDQEHLQJQRW³PH´ 
TXDLQGLYLGXDO,WPLJKWDOVREHVDLGWKDW.DQWZDVQ¶WWKDWFRQFHUQHG about the 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ³KXPDQEHLQJ´DQG³UDWLRQDOEHLQJ´, so could just have well have 
written the same term either way in both sentences. But this is to neglect the fact that 
Kant was deeply concerned about the difference, where his conception of the 
necessity and universality of morality depended on addressing both constituencies 
(man and God), conceived as narrower and wider classes. 
Another difficulty with the constructivist reading of these sentences, is to see 
what contrast there is meant to be between them, in a way that fits the text. One way 
to get a contrast might to be to read the first sentence as pointing to how I represent 
my existence, and the second then saying that this is also how each of us sees 
ourselves, not just me, then trying to argue on this basis concerning how we must treat 
others. But the difficulty with this is that the first sentence already makes this point, 
by saying that this is how human beings in general view themselves, so that the 
contrast marked by ³aber´ here seems to be lost. Of course, if the second sentence 
UHDG³But every other rational being also represents the existence of others in this way 
consequent on just the same rationaOJURXQGWKDWDOVRKROGVIRUPH´ then there would 
be a contrast with the first sentenFHEXWLWGRHVQ¶W7KHDGYDQWDJHRIP\UHDGLQJ
above, however, is that it explains more clearly how Kant might have thought he was 
drawing a contrast here, between how we represent our existence to ourselves qua 
human beings, and how other rational but non-human beings represent their existence 
to themselves, and whether this has the same basis in the value of rational nature. 
,WKHUHIRUHGRQRWDFFHSW%D[OH\¶VFRQVWUXFWLYLVWDFFRXQWRIWKLVFUXFLDOSLHFH
of text, where I would claim that a value realist account fits the evidence much better.  
 
Reply to Dean Moyar 
In his critical comments, Moyar focuses on the second part of Understanding Moral 
Obligation, which deals with Hegel. However, Moyar begins by protesting that in fact 
I do not say enough about Hegel himself in these chapters, which also include 
discussion of Schiller and Bradley. Now, it is not often that I get asked to say more 
DERXW+HJHOVRWKLVPDNHVDUHIUHVKLQJFKDQJHDQG,FDQVHH0R\DU¶VSRLQW%XWWKH
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difficulty in writing about Hegel, is that because of the systematic and interconnected 
QDWXUHRIKLVDSSURDFKLWFDQEHUDWKHU³DOORUQRWKLQJ´HLWKHURQHVWLFNVFORVHO\WRD
OLPLWHGLVVXHDQGIRFXVHVRQWKDWRURQHHQGVXSZULWLQJDERXWWKHZKROHRI+HJHO¶V
philosophy. I opted for the former strategy, just to try and bring out what I take to be 
his account of obligation, while setting it in its relevant context in relation to Kant and 
Schiller ± KHQFHWKHFRQFHQWUDWLRQRQDUHODWLYHO\VPDOOSDUWRI+HJHO¶VZRUNUDWKHU
than the entirety of his ethical system.  Of course, there is then a danger that I have 
VRPHKRZGLVWRUWHG+HJHO¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKHVHPDWWHUVDQGVTXHH]HG+HJHOLQWRWKH
debate artificially ± ZKLFKLVSHUKDSVWKHUHDOVXEVWDQFHRI0R\DU¶VFRQFHUQEXW
obviously I hope to have avoided this, as I will now try to suggest in my replies to his 
more detailed criticisms below. 
 However, there is also one further preliminary issue which Moyar raises, 
which deserves comment. This is whether in thinking about these issues, I have 
changed my mind since publishing an earlier essay on a related theme, entitled 
³)UHHGRP6HOI-/HJLVODWLRQDQG0RUDOLW\LQ.DQWDQG+HJHO´6WHUQ7KRXJK
there is a broad continuity between Understanding Moral Obligation and this paper, 
Moyar is right to spot that I did alter my view somewhat when it comes to Hegel. 
When I wrote the earlier piece, I had thought that perhaps the ultimate upshot of 
+HJHO¶VSRVLWLRQZRXOGEHWRGRDZD\ZLWKWKHQRWLRQVRIREOLJDWLRQDQGGXW\
altogether ± and in some way, I still think something like his position could be 
developed in that manner.vii +RZHYHURQORRNLQJPRUHFORVHO\DW+HJHO¶VRZQ
position for the book, I came to think that this view of Hegel was too simplistic, as it 
seems that Hegel wants to leave room for these notions, where as I point out, they still 
ILJXUHLQKLVWUHDWPHQWRI³(WKLFDO/LIH´LQWKHWKLUGSDUWRIWKHPhilosophy of Right. 
However, it is clear he wants to retain them without falling back into anything like 
.DQW¶VK\EULGDFFRXQWDQGZKLOHDOVRDYoiding a divine command theory, and so he 
needs a different sort of approach ± which is why I think he develops instead what I 
call his social command theory. To this extent, Moyar is therefore right to see a shift 
in my reading of Hegel here, from the earlier article to the book, but in a way that I 
hope is unproblematic. At the same time, nonetheless, I still think there is something 
LPSRUWDQWO\ULJKWDERXWZKDW,VDLGLQWKHDUWLFOHWKDWIRU+HJHO³LQWKHVSKHUHRI
Sittlichkeit´ZKLOHLWLQYROYHVVRFLDOFRPPDQGGXW\QRORQJHUKDV³WKHfeeling of a 
FRPPDQGLPSRVHGRQWKHDJHQW´6WHUQFLWHGDW0R\DU06-5): for I take 
it that there can be duties which involve social enforcement, without the individual 
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experiencing that as any limitation or constraint, much in the way that the law abiding 
citizen can relate to their legal obligations. In this way, then, the Hegelian social 
FRPPDQGPRGHODV,FRQFHLYHLWVWLOOGLIIHUVIURP.DQW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIVHOI-
OHJLVODWLRQIRUZKLFKVXFKDIHHOLQJRI³QHFHVVLWDWLRQ´RUELQGLQJLVFHQWUDO 
But Moyar suggests that perhaps there is a difficulty for me here: for, he 
seems to think that by taking Hegel to have a social command account of obligation, I 
may be pushed back into the constructivist view of Pippin and others than I criticised 
in the article, if we take obligation to be commanded.viii However, I am not sure I see 
the worry. My position is that Hegel only has a social command view of obligation, 
whereas Pippin and others also want to have a social legislation view of the right and 
the good, and so of what is made obligatory by social command; so I take my position 
WRVWLOOEHDQ³LQWHUPHGLDWH´YLHZQRWDIXOO\FRQVWUXFWLYLVWRQHWKDWJRHV³DOOWKHZD\
GRZQ´WRYDOXHVWKHPVHOYHV0R\DUPD\WKLQNWKDWVXFKUealism is itself a threat to 
autonomy, and so must give way to constructivism: but as I argue at length in the 
book (cf. Stern 2012: 7-,GRQRWILQGVXFK³DUJXPHQWVIURPDXWRQRP\´DJDLQVW
realism about value to be convincing, so I do not think there is D³WHQVLRQ´KHUHWKDW
can UHWXUQZLWK³IXOOIRUFH´RQFHZHPRYHWR+HJHO¶VVRFLDOFRPPDQGYLHZDV,
conceive it. I therefore do not think that my shift from the article to the book makes 
things any easier for the constructivist than it was before. 
HoweveU0R\DUFOHDUO\WKLQNVWKDWP\HDUOLHU³QRFRPPDQG´YLHZRI+HJHO
ZDVVRPHKRZFORVHUWRWKHPDUNWKDQP\ODWHU³VRFLDOFRPPDQG´DFFRXQWHYHQZKLOH
DOORZLQJWKDW+HJHO³LQYRNHVWKHODQJXDJHRIGXW\DQGODZ´LQKLVGLVFXVVLRQRI
ethical life (cf. Moyar MS: 4). He thinks, however, if we view that discussion in a 
broader context and alongside the dialectical process that has led up to it, a different 
picture than mine will emerge, where in the next section of his paper he therefore 
IRFXVHVRQ+HJHO¶VDFFRXQWRI³0RUDOLW\´LQDZD\WKDW,GRQRW 
 
If I understand this section correctly, Moyar wants to make two main points. First, 
WKDWP\SHUVSHFWLYHRQ+HJHO¶VFULWLTXHRI.DQWLQWKH³0RUDOLW\´FKDSWHULVVRPHZKDW
distorted, as it concentrates too much on how Hegel (inspired by Schiller) wanted to 
PRYHWKH³IRUP´RIREOLJDWLRQIURPWKHVHOI-legislating Kantian subject to a more 
VRFLDODFFRXQWZKHUHDVWKHUHDOIRFXVFRQFHUQVKRZ³.DQW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIREOLJDWLRQ
gets in the way of determining the specific contenWRIWKHJRRG´0R\DU06
ZKHUHWKLVZRUU\LVIDPLOLDULQWKHJXLVHRIWKHVWDQGDUG³HPSW\IRUPDOLVP´REMHFWLRQ
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0R\DUWKXVDUJXHVWKDW³>+HJHO¶V@IRFXVRQFRQWHQWGRHVQRWVHHPWRVXSSRUW6WHUQ¶V
main narrative, according to which Hegel moves from criticising the duality of the 
Kantian will on the formal side of obligation to invoking a social story in which that 
GXDOLW\LVRYHUFRPH´0R\DU061RZDV0R\DUDQWLFLSDWHVRQHUHVSRQVHKHUH
might be for me to say that in fact while of course the emptiness objection to Kant is a 
FHQWUDOSDUWRI+HJHO¶VGLVFXVVLRQLQWKH³0RUDOLW\´FKDSWHUDQGZKLOHLWPD\HYHQEH
WKH³PDLQ´RQHLWGRHVQ¶WKDYHWREHWKHonly such concern ± and indeed, there is clear 
WH[WXDOHYLGHQFHLQ+HJHO¶VLPSOLFLWUHIHUHQFHVWo Schiller, that his worries about 
.DQW¶VK\EULGPRGHODOVRSOD\VDVLJQLILFDQWUROHKHUHix Given this, therefore, I would 
argue that the move to ethical life is meant to help with both worries, for we now shift 
how we think both about the content of ethics, and its form, as we no longer think of 
duty as what is imposed on us by abstract reason and so grasped through a process of 
testing for universalisability, but as imposed on us by the concrete specifics of social 
life, and so known about within this context. One concern Moyar then has, however, 
is that this response may make the content as well as the form of ethical life a 
constructivist one;x but in order to see ethical life as answering the emptiness 
objection, I do not see why this is required. In fact, on the contrary, it is the fact that 
constructivism faces an emptiness objection of its own that makes a realist account of 
the value of freedom that underlies ethical life attractive.xi  
Another concern Moyar raises, however, is that the appeal to social command 
DVDQDFFRXQWRIREOLJDWLRQ³ULVNVUXQQLQJDIRXORIWKHWKUHDWWRDXWRQRP\>6WHUQ@
GLVFXVVHGLQWKHHDUOLHUDUWLFOH´DVLWOHDGVPH³WRSODFHWRRPXFKZHLJKWRQWKHVRFLDO
DQGQRWHQRXJKZHLJKWRQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VUROHLQKROGLQJKHUVHOIWRHWKLFDOQRUPV´
0R\DU067KLVODVWSRLQWUHODWHVWRDVHFRQGREMHFWLRQWKDWXQGHUOLHV0R\DU¶V
discussion in this section of the paper, which is that by not dealing with the 
³0RUDOLW\´FKDSWHULQDQ\GHWDLO,KDYHPLVVHGKRZIDU+HJHOZDQWVWRPDNHURRP for 
³WKHUROHIRUWKHLQGLYLGXDOLQKROGLQJKHUVHOIWRWKHPRUDOO\JRRG´0R\DU06
where he thinks this gets lost in my account of Hegel as a social command theorist 
when it comes to ethical life. Thus, while Moyar accepts that I am right that Hegel 
GRHVQRWZDQWWRVHHWKH³KROGLQJ´WKDWJRHVRQKHUHLQ.DQWLDQWHUPVQRQHWKHOHVVP\
account goes too far in the other direction, in losing a place for the individual 
altogether ± DSODFHWKDWLVFOHDUHULIZHWDNHWKH³0RUDOLW\´FKDSWHUPRUHVHULRXVO\
wLWKLWVHPSKDVLVRQ³WKHULJKWRIsubjective freedom´WKDWLVKLJKOLJKWHGLQ,WLV
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WKHQWKLVZRUU\WKDWLVGHYHORSHGIXUWKHULQ0R\DU¶VDFFRXQWRIFRQVFLHQFHLQWKH
following section, to which I will now turn before responding to it. 
 
In this third section, Moyar moves on to a topic in Hegel which he thinks I have 
wrongly neglected, and which he thinks sheds a different light on the issues, namely 
+HJHO¶VYLHZRIconscience; where Moyar has of course recently written an important 
book dealing with thiVRYHUORRNHGDVSHFWRI+HJHO¶VHWKLFDOWKRXJKW0R\DU
0R\DUWKLQNV+HJHO¶VDSSHDOWRFRQVFLHQFHKHOSVKLPUHVROYHWKHSUREOHPRIHPSW\
formalism, which he thinks is his pre-HPLQHQWFRQFHUQEXWKHDOVRWKLQNV+HJHO¶V
treatment of conscience tells against my social command reading of Hegel on duty 
and obligation, as in conscience the individual holds herself to the ethical norms, and 
is not just held to them by the community of which she is part, thus retaining the 
LPSRUWDQW³ULJKWRIVXEMHFWLYHIUHHGRP´WKDW0R\DUWKLQNVKDVEHHQORVWRQP\VRFLDO
command reading, with its emphasis on the authority of others. Moyar seems to 
VWUXJJOHDOLWWOHWRH[SODLQZKDWWKLV³KROGLQJWR´DPRXQWVWRUHMHFWLQJWDONRI³VHOI-
LPSRVLWLRQ´DVWRRFORVHWRWKH.DQWLDQPRGHODQGRSWLQJLQVWHDGIRUWDONRI³VHOI-
LQFRUSRUDWLRQ´ZKLFK,FRQIHVV,DPQRWVXUH,IXOO\XQGHUVWDQG 
 1RZQRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHLQWHUHVWRI0R\DU¶VZRUNRQFRQVFLHQFHLQUHODWLRQ
to Hegel, various worries might be raised concerning his appeal to conscience to solve 
WKHSUREOHPRIREOLJDWLRQ)LUVWLVQ¶W+HJHOXOWLPDWHO\ZDU\RIWKHUROHRIFRQVFLHQFH
LQHWKLFV"6HFRQGLVQ¶WFRQVFLHQFH¶VUROHSULPDULO\HSLVWHPLFIRU+HJHO"7KLUGLV
there any textual evidence that Hegel actually appeals to his conception of conscience 
to sole the problem of moral obligation? And finally, at a philosophical level, could 
+HJHO¶VQRWLRQRIFRQVFLHQFHDV0R\DUFRQFHLYHVLWRIIHUDSODXVLEOHDOWHUQDWLYHWRWKH
social command account? Let me briefly consider each in turn. 
 On the first point, the traditional view might be that while Hegel sees the 
)LFKWHDQDSSHDOWRFRQVFLHQFHDVDQDGYDQFHRQ.DQW¶VHPSW\IRUPDOLVPRI
universalising reason, he is also deeply concerned by it as an ethical notion, as 
possibly leading us into a purely individual self-certainty about where the right course 
of action lies, so that it therefore has an emptiness problem of its own. Thus, Hegel 
famously writes of conscience in the Phenomenology³%XWHYHQVRFRQVFLHQFHLV
free from any content whatever; it absolves itself from any specific duty which is 
supposed to have the validity of law. In the strength of is own self-assurance it 
SRVVHVVHVWKHPDMHVW\RIDEVROXWHDXWDUN\WRELQGDQGWRORRVH´+HJHO
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However, Moyar might well respond that Hegel distinguishes between subjective 
conscience of this sort, and true conscience ± where the latter will not be this kind of 
contentless self-assertion, but will precisely get its content through its place within 
ethical life. And I would agree with Moyar that this distinction is one we should take 
seriously, and so would not raise this first objection to his use of conscience in this 
context, where it is clear that Hegel thought that suitably understood, it conscience 
can have a positive role to play, as Moyar brings out. 
 However, I am more sympathetic to the second worry, namely that for Hegel 
conscience is fundamentally an epistemic notion, thought of as a possible source of 
moral knowledge, rather than designed to play a role in explaining the nature of moral 
obligation. Hegel seems to emphasise this epistemic aspect as central when he speaks 
DERXWFRQVFLHQFHIRUH[DPSOHLQWKHIROORZLQJSDVVDJH³Conscience expresses the 
absolute entitlement of subjective self-consciousness to know in itself and from itself 
what right and duty are, and to recognize only what it thus knows as the good; it also 
consists in the assertion that what it thus knows and wills is truly right and duty´
(Hegel 1821a: §137R, p. 164 (my bold emphasis)). Likewise, it is on conscience as a 
power of judgement that Hegel lays emphasis in a passage Moyar himself cites, while 
also emphasising that conscience sees itself as the power whereby what ought to be is 
brought about (Hegel 1821a: §138, p. 166; cf. Moyar MS: 13). Primarily, therefore, 
conscience is introduced by Hegel as a way to reconceive the problem of moral 
NQRZOHGJHWKDW.DQW¶VWHVWRIXQLYHUVDOLVDELOLW\FRXOGQRWVROYHWKHGLVFXVVLRQLV
consequently focused on epistemic issues, not on the problem of explaining how 
moUDOREOLJDWLRQLVSRVVLEOHZKHUHWKH³ULJKWRIVXEMHFWLYHIUHHGRP´VHHPVWRPDLQO\
concern our right to claim an understanding for ourselves of the right and the good, 
not our capacity to hold ourselves to it.xii 
 The third worry is the lack of textual evidHQFHIRU0R\DU¶VFODLPWKDW+HJHO
XVHVFRQVFLHQFHWRUHVROYHWKLVSUREOHPRIREOLJDWLRQ0R\DU¶VPRVWGLUHFWVXSSRUW
ZRXOGVHHPWRFRPHIURPWKHIROORZLQJSDVVDJH³Earlier and more sensuous ages 
have before them something external and given, whether this be religion or right; but 
[my] conscience knows itself as thought, and that this thought of mine is my sole 
source of obligation´+HJHOD$S. However, it seems to me that to 
UHDGWKLVDV+HJHO¶VILQDOZRUGLVWRIDLOWRDSSUHFLDWHWKHGLDlectical structure of the 
Philosophy of Right: conscience itself is here presented as having this view of 
obligation, where to some extent Hegel is presenting this as an improvement on 
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thinking that obligation just comes externally from God or natural law; but it still 
VHHPVWRPHWREHDPLVWDNHWRWDNHWKLVWREH+HJHO¶Vfinal word on obligation, when 
in fact this is immediately qualified by what he writes in the subsequent paragraphs.xiii 
For, Hegel goes on to suggest that if conscience is to avoid becoming merely 
subjective, it must see obligation as prior to itself, and will only see itself alone as the 
source of obligation when the social ground for such obligations has been 
XQGHUPLQHG+HJHOWKHUHIRUHZULWHVWKDW³WKHWUXHFRQVFLHQFHLVWKDWZKLFKGHWHUPines 
itself to will what is in and for itself WKHJRRGDQGGXW\´+HJHOD$S
my emphasis), and so what is obligatory already, not what it itself makes obligatory 
by a process of self-imposition or self-incorporation. So, while there are cases and 
situations in which individuals can take themselves to be the source of obligations and 
duties, Hegel seems to treat these cases as ³pathological´ and non-ideal:xiv the better 
way to conceive of obligation is when this operates in a rational state, and where then 
conscience seeks to determine what those duties are, rather treating itself as their 
³VRXUFH´,ZRXOGDUJXHWKHUHIRUHWKDWconscience forms the transition to ethical life, 
not just because the latter provides it with content (as on Moyar¶V view), but also 
because it provides us with a better account of duty and obligation, as a social 
command model. 
 6R,FRQIHVVWKDW,DPQRWFRQYLQFHGE\0R\DU¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLYHFODLPWKDWWKH
UROHRIFRQVFLHQFHLQ+HJHO¶VGLVFXVVLRQLVWRVROYHWKHSUREOem of moral obligation. 
But, suppose this case could in fact be made; even if it were accepted, would it count 
against the social command model at a philosophical level, and somehow undermine 
it? In fact, I think, it is quite possible to allow that Hegel wants conscience to play a 
significant part in how we think of obligation in a way that does not compete with my 
social command view of Hegel, but rather complements it. Moreover, making this 
clear may forestall some of the earlier worries we have noted that Moyar has, 
FRQFHUQLQJWKHZD\P\YLHZDSSDUHQWO\QHJOHFWV+HJHO¶VHPSKDVLVRQ³WKHULJKWRI
subjective freedom´LQWKHZD\WKDWLWVHHPVWRJLYHSULPDF\WRWKHVRFLDORYHUWKH
individual. 
 To see how this link between conscience and the social command view might 
ZRUNLWLVXVHIXOWRUHWXUQWRWKHSDVVDJHIURP-RKQ6WXDUW0LOO¶VUtilitarianismxv 
which provides the inspiration for many social command theorists, including Baier. 
For, in this passage, it is notable that when Mill introduces the account of sanctions 
WKDWIRUPVSDUWRIWKLVYLHZKHGRHVQ¶Wjust talk about the punishment of the 
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LQGLYLGXDOWKDWFRPHVIURPODZDQGIURP³WKHRSLQLRQRIKLVIHOORZ-FUHDWXUHV´EXW
also DERXWWKDWZKLFKFRPHVIURP³WKHUHSURDFKHVRIKLVRZQFRQVFLHQFH´7KXVRQ
this view, if an obligatory act is one to which blame may be legitimately attached as a 
form of sanction, then that may come as much from the conscience of the individual 
DVIURPWKH³UHSURDFKHV´RIWKHFRPPXQLW\ZKHUHLWLVQRSDUWRIWKHVRFLDOFRPPDQG
view as I understand it, that the latter somehow excludes or renders redundant the 
IRUPHU2QWKHFRQWUDU\ZKHQ³ZH´IHHOPRUDOEODPHRIWKHLQGLYLGXDOZRXOGEH
appropriate and hence that an act is obligatory, we will also take it that the individual 
would be able to view the situation likewise and so also blame themselves, thus 
imposing the same standards on themselves as we do on them.xvi Of course, the 
converse is also true: namely, that the individual will not hold that they alone have the 
authority to blame, as in self-EODPHWKH\ZLOOWDNHLWWKDWWKH\DOVRVSHDNIRUWKH³ZH´
DQGQRWMXVWWKH³,´DQGVRPXVWMXGJHWKHLUDWWLWXGHDFFRUGLQJO\± from the fact that I 
would blame myself, it does not follow directly that I am under an obligation because 
others may question my reactive attitude; and from the fact that I would not blame 
myself, it does not follow directly that I am not under an obligation, for others may 
again question my reactive attitude, so that blame is something we share as 
individuals within the moral community. But again, this should sound quite Hegelian, 
DVUHODWLQJQDWXUDOO\WRKLVGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH³VXEMHFWLYH´FRQVFLHQFHZKLFK
thinks that only what its conscience would criticise or allow us to do is what counts, 
DQGWKH³WUXH´FRQVFience which does not, and so treats blameworthiness as a more 
social and objective matter, to be checked against what it is that the ethical 
FRPPXQLW\GHPDQGVRIXVQRWMXVWWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VRZQDWWLWXGHRIVHOI-blame. 
 This, then, shows how the social command theorist can allow a place for 
conscience in their theory, just as Mill himself does, without undermining the basic 
account that they offer of obligation. Thus, while the label I have used for this 
position may suggest that the social somehow has primacy over the individual, this 
impression is a mistake ± ZKLFK0R\DU¶VHPSKDVLVRQFRQVFLHQFHKDVLURQLFDOO\PDGH
it possible to bring out. 
 
In the next section of his comments, Moyar turns from the account of duty in 
³0RUDOLW\´WRWKHDFFRXQWLQ³(WKLFDO/LIH´ZKHUH,FODLPWKDWWKLVVRFLDOFRPPDQG
account is located; his main aim here, therefore, is to question the textual evidence 
that I offer in support of my reading. 
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 0R\DULQIDFWVWDUWVZLWKWKHSDVVDJHZLWKZKLFK³(WKLFDO/LIH´EHJLQVDQG
which he WKLQNVLPPHGLDWHO\UHIXWHVP\YLHZZKHUH+HJHOZULWHVWKDW³(WKLFDO/LIH
is the Idea of Freedom as the living good which has its knowledge and volition in 
self-consciousness, and its actuality through self-FRQVFLRXVDFWLRQ´+HJHOD
§142, p. 189). FURPWKLVUDWKHUJQRPLFXWWHUDQFH0R\DUFRQFOXGHVWKDW³+HJHO
LGHQWLILHV(WKLFDO/LIHDVDZKROHZLWKWKHOLYLQJJRRGWKDWLVZLWKYDOXH´ZKHUHKH
FODLPVWKDW³>W@KLVUXQVFRXQWHUWR6WHUQ¶VLQWXLWLRQWKDWVRPHWKLQJDGGLWLRQDOLVQHHGHG
to convert the gRRGLQWRWKHREOLJDWRU\´0R\DU06,DPQRWVXUHKRZKHFDQEH
so confident of this, however, as at this very early stage in the chapter, the question of 
obligation and duty has not even come up; in fact, to introduce it, Hegel in the next 
paragraph LQWURGXFHVWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDW³FRQVFLRXVQHVVRIWKHdifference between 
WKHVHPRPHQWVRIWKH,GHDLVSUHVHQW´+HJHODSP\HPSKDVLV
albeit of course in what will turn out to be a difference that also involves identity, in 
the traditionaOGLDOHFWLFDOPDQQHU$JDLQJLYHQWKHVKHHUDEVWUDFWQHVVRI+HJHO¶V
FRPPHQWVKHUH,ZRXOGQ¶WZDQWWRSXWWRRPXFKLQWHUSUHWDWLYHZHLJKWRQWKLV
paragraph either: but in so far as Moyar takes the first of them to be indicative of 
some sort of immediate unity between the good and our consciousness of its 
REOLJDWRU\IRUFHLQDZD\WKDWLVDNLQWRWKHQDWXUDOODZWKHRULVW¶VYLHZFI0R\DU06
19), it is arguable perhaps that this immediacy is put into question by the second of 
these paragraphs This impression is reinforced by the next paragraph (§144), where 
+HJHOZULWHVWKDWZLWKWKLVGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHPRPHQWVRIWKH,GHD³>W@KHREMHFWLYH
VSKHUHRIHWKLFV«takes the place of WKHDEVWUDFWJRRG´+HJHODS
my emphasis), where it is only at this point that talk of laws, duty and obligation is 
then introduced. Far from telling against my reading as Moyar suggests, therefore, I 
ZRXOGDUJXHWKDWWKHVHRSHQLQJSDUDJUDSKVRI³(WKLFDO/LIH´DFWXDOO\FRQIRUPWRP\
account whereby the good and the obligatory are not to be related to one another 
immediately. 
 Moyar then moves on to consider the three main passages which I cite in 
VXSSRUWRIP\VRFLDOFRPPDQGYLHZEHJLQQLQJZLWK³,QUHODWLRQWRWKHVXEMHFW
the ethical substance and its laws and powers are on the one hand an object, in as 
much as they are, in the supreme sense of self-sufficiency. They are thus an absolute 
DXWKRULW\DQGSRZHULQILQLWHO\PRUHILUPO\EDVHGWKDQWKHEHLQJRIQDWXUH´0R\DU
seems to want to make two points here. On the one hand, while he accepts that Hegel 
WDONVDERXW³ODZVDQGSRZHUV´ZKLFKPD\LPSO\VRPHHOHPHQWRIVDQFWLRQ0R\DU
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WKLQNVKHLV³LQSDUWWDONLQJDERXWDFWXDOSRVLWLYHODZVDQGSRZHUVVXFKDVWKHSROLFH
DQGMXGLFLDU\´DQGVRQRWDERXWmoral obligation at all, but only legal obligation, so 
WKDWWKLVSDVVDJHFDQ¶WFRXQWLQIDYRXURIP\YLHZ0R\DU062QWKHRWKHU
hand, he argues that such laws and powers must be assessed as expressive of the 
good, where it is because of this that we are under an obligation to comply with them, 
not because they involve sanctions (Moyar MS: 20). 
 0\UHVSRQVHWRWKHILUVWSRLQWLVWKDWZKLOH+HJHOPD\LQGHHG³LQSDUW´EH
talking about legal obligations here, it is clear that it is not all he is talking about, as 
what is sDLGWRKDYHWKHVHODZVDQGSRZHUVLV³WKHHWKLFDORUGHU´LQJHQHUDOQRW
merely the juridical structures of the state. In fact, it is by making the latter 
assumption that Moyar creates difficulties for the social command view that are 
merely apparent, by assuming that on that account, sanctions must involve legal 
sanctions such as judicial punishment and constraint. But as we saw already in the 
previous discussion of blame, this is not essential to the view, where the kind of 
sanction involved need not be of this type, where the example of the duty of charity 
can be handled precisely in this way. And my response to the second point is that 
again it involves an element of caricature with respect to the social command view: 
for, while the sanction may be required to make an act into a duty, part of the 
intermediate view is that this sanction can only legitimately apply to what is right and 
JRRGVRWRWKDWH[WHQWRXUGXWLHV³H[SUHVV´VXFKYDOXHVUDWKHUWKDQEHLQJXQUHODWHGWR
them as Moyar implies. Of course, it is true that on this view there is a difference 
between what is morally good and what is a moral duty; but even so, while the 
VDQFWLRQLVVDLGWREHZKDWH[SODLQVWKLVGLIIHUHQFHLWVWLOOGRHVQ¶WIROORZWKDWZHDFW
on this duty because of the sanction, in any motivational or reason-giving sense: we 
act because it is our duty, where the sanction is just part of what makes it so. 
 0R\DUWKHQPRYHVWRDVHFRQGSDVVDJHZKLFKLV³$OOWKHVHVXEVWDQWLDO
determinations are duties which are binding on the will of the individual; for the 
individual, as subjective and inherently undetermined ± or determined in a particular 
way ± is distinct from them and consequently stands in a relationship to them as to his 
RZQVXEVWDQWLDOEHLQJ´)DUIURPVXSSRUWLQJP\DFFount of duty as involving a social 
command, Moyar argues that this passage supports a more Kantian position, whereby 
duty does not involve attraction but rather constraint, in so far as the individual stands 
over against the good that makes up ethical life and distinguishes himself from them. 
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 +HUHZKHUH,GLVDJUHHZLWK0R\DULVLQKLVVXJJHVWLRQWKDW+HJHO¶VWDONRI
³VXEVWDQWLDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQV´VKRXOGEH³UHDGDVDFODLPDERXWvalue configurations´
and hence the good; it seems pretty clear to me that the ³VXEVWDQWLDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQV´
in question are the laws and powers of ethical life that are first introduced in §146. 
However, to some extent I agree with him that there is something Kantian about §148, 
EXWZKHUHWKH³JDS´LVQRWEHWZHHQWKHLQGLYLGXDODQGWhe good, but the individual and 
these laws and powers ± so that we may come to feel that in doing our duty we are 
hereby being constrained, in a Kantian manner. However, I do not think this is the end 
of the story: for in the next section, Hegel precisely tries to get away from this 
Kantian model, while not giving up on all talk of duty as a result. For, in §149 he goes 
on to argue that while such laws and powers have the capacity to bind us,xvii here we 
do not find real constraint but in fact liberation, so tKDWLQWKHHQGWKH³JDS´FDQEH
overcome and so cannot be used to explain our ethical duties. Thus, the bindingness 
of the duty cannot be traced back to the Kantian difference between the good and the 
individual, but to the fact that they come from the laws and powers of ethical 
substance, as my social command account suggests. 
 )LQDOO\0R\DUFRQVLGHUVDWKLUGSDVVDJHZKLFKLV5³,QDQHWKLFDO
community, it is easy to say what someone must do and what the duties are which he 
has to fulfil in order to be virtuous. He must simply do what is prescribed, expressly 
stated, and known to him within his situation. Rectitude is the universal quality which 
PD\EHUHTXLUHGRIKLPSDUWO\E\ULJKWDQGSDUWO\E\HWKLFV´5HDGLQJWKLVRQLWVRZQ
Moyar argues that it does not support the social command view, as there is no 
mention here of any social subject as doing the requiring, as this simply comes about 
³SDUWO\E\ULJKWDQGSDUWO\E\HWKLFV´± RU³SDUWO\E\ODZDQGSDUWO\E\FXVWRP´DVLW
could also be translated.xviii I agree that taken in isolation, this is perhaps so: but given 
the broader context, and what we have already learned (I claim) about the laws and 
powers of the ethical substance, and how that substance involves the exercise of 
authority over the individual, I find it hard not to read this as the background to this 
paragraph, and thus as implying the social context in which such requirements are laid 
GRZQ,WKHUHIRUHFDQQRWDFFHSW0R\DU¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHILQDOVHQWHQFH³VRXQGV
like a view in which the right and the good are doing the obligating/requiring, rather 
WKDQDYLHZLQZKLFKWKHVRFLDOFRPPDQGPXVWEHDGGHGWRWKHJRRG´0R\DU06
)RU,WKLQNE\WKLVWLPHZHKDYHDOUHDG\OHDUQWWRDVVRFLDWHZKDWLV³ULJKW´
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>UHFKWOLFK@DQG³HWKLFDO´>VLttlich] with the laws and institutions of the community and 
LWV³HWKLFDOSRZHUV´QRWZLWKZKDWPD\EHULJKWDQGJRRGRQLWVRZQ 
 At the end of this section of his paper, Moyar brings two further passages to 
bear against my account. The first is §148, where Hegel contrasts his position in Part 
Three of the Philosophy of Right with that of Kant and Fichte, where Hegel claims to 
VKRZWKDW³HWKLFDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQVDUHQHFHVVDU\UHODWLRQV´0R\DUWDNHVWKLVWDONRI
QHFHVVDU\UHODWLRQVWRPHDQ³DFHUWDLQNLQGRI obligating fact is operative in an ethical 
ZRUOG´ZLWKRXW³WKHH[HUFLVHRIRYHUWVRFLDOSUHVVXUH´0R\DU06+RZHYHULW
VHHPVWRPHWKDWWKHQHFHVVLW\KHUHLVQRWWKDWRIWKH³PRUDOPXVW´EXWDNLQGRI
systematic necessity, where Hegel is making his familiar claim that he can provide a 
more properly structured account than his rivals were able to do of the specific types 
or determinations of ethical life. I therefore do not think that this passage is directly 
relevant to the issue at hand. 
 The second passage Moyar cites against me is §147, where Hegel argues that 
the laws and powers of the ethical substance are not to be seen as alien to the 
individual, where I argue that this is to be understood as meaning that the individual is 
herself part of the moral community that issues the command, and so is not 
subordinated to it as by an alien will. Moyar argues, however, that this account is too 
close to a social contract theory of ethical norms of the sort Hegel rejects, while the 
identity in question coQFHUQVWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VJRRGDQGWKDWRIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVRI
ethical life. In response, I would claim that there is no need to see the social command 
SRVLWLRQLQFRQWUDFWXDOWHUPVDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKLWLV³P\consent to join with others 
[that] eliminates WKHDOLHQQHVV´0R\DU06RQWKHFRQWUDU\WKDWDOLHQQHVVLV
overcome by the sense that the individual has of possessing their identity as part of 
this community, so that these laws and powers operate from a perspective that one 
shares with others, whereas the contractual model would keep the individual and 
community at odds.   
 Moyar concludes this section by making what seems to me to be a significant 
VWHSLQP\GLUHFWLRQZKHUHKHZULWHV³+DYLQJDUJXHGDJDLQVWWKHVRFLDOFRPPDQG
view, I should say WKDW,GRDJUHHWKDWRXUKROGLQJHDFKRWKHUWRWKHFRPPXQLW\¶V
QRUPVLVDFUXFLDOSDUWRI+HJHO¶VHWKLFV(OVHZKHUH,KDYHDUJXHGWKDWWKHVRFLDO
bindingness is the objective side of the rational identity, while conscience is the 
subjective side, and both DUHQHFHVVDU\LQ+HJHO¶VRYHUDOOYLHZ´0R\DU06,Q
recognizing the way in which we hold each other to account, and perhaps in coming 
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to recognize that the social command view can also allow that we hold ourselves to 
account in self-blame, it would seem that in the end there is not such a difference 
between us after all. 
 
In the next section, however, Moyar continues to argue in favour of thinking of 
+HJHO¶VSRVLWLRQDVD³FRQVFLHQFH-EDVHGYLHZ´DVagainst a social command view, 
because he continues to see them as fundamentally at odds with each other. Thus, he 
points to passages in the Phenomenology where Hegel recognizes the significance of 
conscience within modernity, and to his discussion of the relation between the ethical 
and religious conscience in the treatment of world history in the Encyclopedia, while 
he also emphasizes the balance between self-LQWHUHVWDQGFRQVFLHQFHZLWKLQ+HJHO¶V
treatment of civil society. Given what I have said previously, however, it should by 
now be clear that Moyar is working with a false dichotomy:xix the social command 
view does not have to set aside the role of conscience, in so far as it sees self-blame as 
one of the important sanctions within ethical life that give rise to obligation, albeit a 
self-blame that is not given some priority over the blame of the community of which 
one is also part, where it is through this process that (on this account) duty and 
obligation are to be understood. 
 
Finally, Moyar turns to the dispute between Hegel and Kierkegaard, as I present it. 
7KLVFRQFHUQVWKHLVVXHRIWKHGHPDQGLQJQHVVRIWKHHWKLFDODQGZKHWKHURQ+HJHO¶V
account, the bar is set too low. Moyar thinks that while this objection may be 
plausible on the social command account, he thinks a conscience-based view will put 
Hegel in a better position, as on this view one is required to engage in moral 
deliberation, to aim at substantial ends, and negotiate between conflicting norms. 
Moreover, he suggests that even the institutional norms of modern ethical life are 
more problematic than the Kierkegaardian might think, as one can see by thinking of 
how difficult it is for us to be a good father or husband, given the pressures and 
conflicts involved in these sorts of roles. 
 Now, it seems to me that both of these responses to the Kierkegaardian could 
EHPDGHDVPXFKRQWKHVRFLDOFRPPDQGYLHZDVRQDYLHZOLNH0R\DU¶VWKDWVHHNVWR
highlight the role for conscience ± or to put it another way, that if (as I suggest) the 
portrait of Judge William in Either/Or is meant to be an attack on the smug 
complacency of Hegelian ethical life, then it is something of a caricature. Thus, there 
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PD\ZHOOEHVRPHPHULWLQ0R\DU¶VUHVSRQVHKHUHWKRXJK,WKLQNWKHVHQVLEOHSRLQWV
he makes can be put forward without thinking they tell decisively against the social 
FRPPDQGYLHZDVLIWKLVLPSOLHGWKDW³>LW@OHDYHVOLWWOHIRUWKHVXEMHFWWRGREXW
UHVSRQGDSSURSULDWHO\WKHPRGHVWGHPDQGVRIWKH6WDWH´xx For example, in §150, 
ZKLOHFODLPLQJWKDW³>L@QDQHWKLFDOFRPPXQLW\LWLVHDV\WRVD\what someone must 
do and what WKHGXWLHVDUHZKLFKKHKDVWRIXOILOLQRUGHUWREHYLUWXRXV´DV³>K@H
must simply do what is prescribed, expressly stated, and known to him within his 
VLWXDWLRQ´+HJHOQRQHWKHOHVVVWLOOUHFRJQL]HVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIWHQVLRQVRU³FROOLVLRQV´
ZLWKLQHWKLFDOOLIH³LQH[WUDRUGLQDU\FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ZKLFKPD\WKHQLQYROYHWKHNLQG
of demands that Moyar speaks about. 
 Nonetheless, it seems to me that what Moyar says here about the 
demandingness of ethical life for Hegel will still not really address the core of 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VFRPSODLQWRUVKRZKRZ+HJHOFDQHVFDSHWKHGLDOHFWLFDOELQGWKDWWKH
Kierkegaardian thinks he is in: namely, that if Hegel makes our ethical requirements 
WRRVWURQJWKHQ.DQW¶VDFFRXQWRIREOLJDWLRQZLOOEHFRPHLQFUHDVLQJly plausible, 
because it will again look as if obligation comes about through self-constraint, as we 
struggle with ourselves to do what is called for. Indeed, it is arguably precisely this 
dialectic that is work in §150 that we have just discussed, where Hegel contrasts the 
rectitude that just consists in following the duties laid down by the ethical community, 
with the virtue of Kantian morality, which consists in a battle with oneself to do what 
LVULJKWZKHUH³VXFKWDONZLWKLWVUHDVRQVDQGH[SRVLWLRQV is directed at the individual 
DVDQDUELWUDU\ZLOODQGVXEMHFWLYHFDSULFH´+HJHOS7KXVLIWKH
Hegelian sets the bar of ethical life too high, what will again be required of us is 
virtue rather than rectitude, and thus just the kind of self-constraint that fits the 
Kantian model of obligation which Hegel had wanted to escape. Nothing Moyar says, 
,WKLQNVKRZVKRZ+HJHOFDQDYRLGWKHVWUXFWXUDOGLIILFXOW\WKDW.LHUNHJDDUG¶V
discussion brings out. Of course, the Hegelian can respond (as I discuss in the book) 
by claiming that the Kierkegaardian is simply wrong to claim that ethics has the kind 
of demandingness that they attribute to it ± but that is to opt for a strategy that is not 
VXJJHVWHGE\0R\DU¶VUHPDUNVDQGWRZKLFKKLVFODLPVRn behalf of conscience do 
not seem to contribute. 
 
 
Reply to William Bristow 
 25 
7KHIRFXVRI%ULVWRZ¶VFRPPHQWVDUHP\WUHDWPHQWRI.LHUNHJDDUGZKHUH,UHDGKLP
DVDQ³LQWHUPHGLDWH´GLYLQHFRPPDQGWKHRULVWZKRRQWKHRQHKDQGLVFULWLFDORI
+HJHO¶VVRFLDOFommand account of obligation, and who on the other leads us back to 
a position which (I claim) Kant rejects, and so completes the dialectical circle of 
positions that I discuss. 
 Bristow raises two kinds of worries for my account of Kierkegaard: first, he 
thinks I am wrong on interpretative grounds; and second, he thinks even if I was right, 
the result would not be of much interest philosophically, as the position I attribute to 
Kierkegaard is too obviously weak to play a role in the dialectic that I set out, and so 
does not represent a serious competitor to the views represented by Kant and Hegel ± 
so that interpretative charity should lead us to read his position differently. In what 
follows, I will try to respond to both sets of concerns. 
 
(a) Interpretative objections 
%ULVWRZ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLYHFRQFHUQPLJKWEHVXPPHGXSLQWKHVSOHQGLGWLWOHRI5RQDOG
*UHHQ¶VSDSHU³(QRXJKLV(QRXJKFear and Trembling is Not $ERXW(WKLFV´
*UHHQ2QWKLVVRUWRIYLHZ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKH$EUDKDPVWRU\Ls 
meant to show that ethical obligations may be suspended in favour of religious 
obligations, and therefore that the highest practical demands upon us cannot be made 
UDWLRQDOO\FRPSUHKHQVLEOHEXWDUHPDWWHUVRIIDLWK7KXVLWLVDUJXHG.LHUNHJDDUG¶V
discussion of the Akedah in Fear and Trembling cannot be cited as grounds for 
thinking Kierkegaard held a divine command theory of ethics, notwithstanding the 
UROHRI*RG¶VFRPPDQGLQWKHVWRU\DVIRU.LHUNHJDDUGWKHVWRU\LVQRWUHDOO\DERXW
ethics at all. Likewise, Bristow thinks, the Works of Love are also debarred from being 
treated in this way, as this would be to attribute to this text some sort of moral 
DUJXPHQWIRU*RG¶VH[LVWHQFHZKHUHDVLQIDFWLWLVRQHRI.LHUNHJDDUG¶V³&KULVWLDQ
GHOLEHUDWLRQV´WKDWLVQRWDLPHGDWDQ\VXFKSKLORVRSKLFDOJRDOEXWUDWKHUWR³UHFDOO
ZD\ZDUG&KULVWLDQVWRWKHIXQGDPHQWVRIWKHLUIDLWK´%ULVWRZ06)RU%ULVWRZ
therefore, my way of approaching Kierkegaard is deeply mistaken, and misses the 
whole point of his authorship. 
 1RZVWURQJO\³DQWL-SKLORVRSKLFDO´UHDGLQJVRIWKLVVRUWRIFRXUVHKDYHD
highly respectable pedigree when it comes to thinking about Kierkegaard, where the 
FRQFHUQLVWKDWE\IDLOLQJWRSXW.LHUNHJDDUGLQDGLVWLQFWLYHO\³UHOLJLRXV´WUDGLWLRQRf 
some sort, we water down his thinking and reduce his radicalism, somehow 
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³GRPHVWLFDWLQJ´DQGWDPLQJKLPWKHUHE\,ZRXOGOLNHWRVXJJHVWKRZHYHUWKDWWKH
approach I adopt can also make good sense of the kind of challenge Kierkegaard 
thinks the Abraham story offers to philosophy in general and philosophical ethics in 
SDUWLFXODU)RUZKLOH,FODLPWKDW.LHUNHJDDUGLVQRWDYROXQWDULVWFRQFHUQLQJ*RG¶V
commands, I argue that he takes the more moderate intermediate view to still carry 
the implication that what God can legitimately ask of us may outstrip the reach of our 
grasp of the right and the good ± in a way that a more traditional Enlightenment 
ethicist such as Kant rejects as inconceivable.xxi Even on my account, therefore, 
Kierkegaard may be read as operating outside the ambit of what many rationalist 
philosophers would find acceptable and thus as challenging the position they adopt; 
but he does so on the philosophical grounds that it is an implication of any position 
which allows God into the picture oIHWKLFVDWDOOZKHUHLWZLOOIROORZWKDW*RG¶V
grasp of the right and the good must then be accepted to be beyond ours, given the 
differences in wisdom and perspective between us ± where insofar as Kant also 
allows God a role in his ethics (cf. Stern 2012: 57-67), this is equally an implication 
KHWRRVKRXOGILQGKDUGWRUHVLVWDWOHDVWIURP.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSRLQWRIYLHZ2QP\
DSSURDFKWKHUHIRUH.LHUNHJDDUGGRHVLQGHHG³VXVSHQG´HWKLFVEXWQRWE\VWHSSLQJ
outside the realm of the ethical altogether and so into some realm of the religious that 
is wholly distinct from it, but rather by stepping outside an ethics which takes it for 
granted that what ethics demands is always known to us from the human perspective, 
where from a religious point of view that is nonetheless still ethical in a broader 
sense, this assumption can be challenged and in fact makes little sense. 
 7KXVZKHUH%ULVWRZSRLQWVWRPDQ\GLVWLQFWLYHIHDWXUHVRI.LHUNHJDDUG¶V
discussion in Fear and Trembling, I would claim that my approach fits with these 
features and is perfectly capable of accommodating them, even while taking a more 
³SKLORVRSKLFDO´DSSURDFKWKDQ%ULVWRZDQGQRGRXEWRWKHUVZRXOGOLNH:KLOHWKLVLV
discussed in further detail in the book, let me briefly mention the features I have in 
mind, as Bristow lays them out in his challenge to me. 
 First, he emphasizes that Fear and Trembling is written against those 
+HJHOLDQVZKRWKLQNWKDWIDLWKDQGVREHOLHILQ*RGLVPHUHFKLOG¶VSOD\WKXVIRU
%ULVWRZ³[a]s a rebuke to this common understanding of faith and of its relation to 
philosophy, Johannes means to show the faith of father Abraham to be extremely 
VSLULWXDOO\GHPDQGLQJH[DFWO\EHFDXVHWKLVIDLWKFRQVLVWVLQVWDNLQJRQHVHOIWR³WKH
DEVXUG´EH\RQGDSRLQWZKHUHUHDVRQFDQprovide sense or assurance´%ULVWRZ06
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7). But I would claim that my reading of Kierkegaard fits this characterisation, where 
precisely by accepting that the ethical does not conform to our powers of reasoning, 
ZHPD\ILQGLQLWQR³VHQVHRUDVVXUDQFH´and thus be faced with a demand that looks 
³DEVXUG´0RUHRYHUWKH³OHDSRIIDLWK´WKDWWKLVUHTXLUHVVWHPVIURPWKHVDPHIHDWXUH
for, if we knew that we were being asked to do is certainly wrong, then we could 
know that it is not God who is asking us to do it (as Kant insists); or if we knew that 
God is asking us to do it, we would know that it is somehow the right thing to do, 
HYHQLIZHFDQ¶WVHHZK\± but here our grounds for thinking it is God comes from 
what it is he asks us to do. So again, reason cannot help us find a way out here, if the 
right is indeed transcendent in the way that the intermediate divine command theory I 
am attributing to Kierkegaard suggests.  
 ,QKLVDFFRXQW%ULVWRZDOVRHPSKDVLVHVWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKH³NQLJKWRI
IDLWK´VXFKDV$EUDKDPDQGWKH³WUDJLFKHUR´VXFKDV$JDPHPQRQ+RZHYHU
again, I think that my account can also accommodate this difference: For the tragic 
hero, the ethical grounds on which he is operating are transparent (the good of one vs 
the good of many, for example), and so explicable to all; but for the knight of faith, 
they are opaque, so not communicable or rationally defensible in this way, which is 
why (on my view) de Silentio precisely emphasises the way in which Abraham is 
forced to remain silent, as he cannot point to any generally accepted basis on which to 
justify his actions, unlike the tragic hero. 
 ,WPD\VHHPKRZHYHUWKDWZKHUH%ULVWRZ¶VDFFRXQWLVDWDJUHDWDGYDQWDJH
FRPSDUHGWRPLQHLVRYHU.LHUNHJDDUG¶VLQVLVWHQFHWKDWZKDWWKH$EUDham story 
VKRZVLVWKH³WHOHRORJLFDOVXVSHQVLRQRIWKHHWKLFDO´%ULVWRZULJKWO\HPSKDVLVHVWKLV
FUXFLDOIHDWXUHRI.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSRVLWLRQDQGWDNHVLWWREHGHFLVLYHLQPRYLQJXV
from the ethical to WKHUHOLJLRXVDVVRPHWKLQJZKROO\³RWKHU´ZKHUHKHZULtes: 
³LQVRIDUDVZHSUDLVH$EUDKDPIRUKLVIDLWKZHPXVWUHFRJQL]HWKDWethical duties can 
be appropriately suspended in favour of higher demands´%ULVWRZ06)RU
%ULVWRZWKHUHIRUHWKHZD\LQZKLFK*RG¶VFRPPDQGWR$EUDKDPVXVSHQGVWKH
ethical is to take him into the realm of the unethical in every sense, by imposing on 
him instead an entirely religious obligation, to which the ethical is entirely foreign. 
 ,ZRXOGVXJJHVWKRZHYHUWKDWZHGRQRWKDYHWRVHHWKH³WHOHRORJLFDO
suspension of the ethiFDO´LQVXFKDEODFN-and-white way. Thus, on my account, in 
RQHVHQVHZHFDQFHUWDLQO\VD\WKDW*RG¶VFRPPDQGLVXQHWKLFDOQDPHO\LQJRLQJ
against what we take to be one of the fundamental principles of ethics as we 
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understand it, and that in following GoG¶VFRPPDQGWKLVLVWKHHWKLFDORXWORRNWKDW
KDVWREH³VXVSHQGHG´ZLWKDOOWKHDWWHQGDQWDQ[LHWLHVDQGWHQVLRQVZKLFK
Kierkegaard describes. However, on the sort of view I am attributing to Kierkegaard, 
what is commanded need not be taken to be unethical from *RG¶V perspective, not 
because he can make anything ethical (as on a radically voluntarist view), but because 
his conception of what it is right to do, and so of what can be legitimately 
commanded, may well differ from ours, given the standpoint from which he 
operates.xxii On this account, therefore, Kierkegaard can perfectly well talk about a 
³VXVSHQVLRQRIWKHHWKLFDO´KHUHZKHUHWKDWPHDQVDVXVSHQVLRQRIRXUQRUPDOVHQVH
RIULJKWDQGZURQJZLWKRXWPHDQLQJWKDWZHPXVWWDNH*RG¶VFRPPDQGWREHwholly 
XQHWKLFDOLQ%ULVWRZ¶VVHQVH,IZHUHDG.LHUNHJDDUGDVDQLQWHUPHGLDWHGLYLQH
command theorist of this kind, there is therefore a way of capturing the sense in 
which Kierkegaard thinks belief in God can commit the Christian to the possibility 
that the HWKLFDOFDQEH³VXVSHQGHG´ZKLFKWKXVUHPDLQVFHQWUDOWRP\DFFRXQW 
 Nonetheless, Bristow might respond, if we do interpret Kierkegaard as an 
intermediate divine command theorist, this is just to put him back within the 
philosophical tradition of Suarez and Scotus, whereas his whole purpose as a 
Christian thinker was to challenge any such tradition (cf. Bristow MS: 18). However, 
while I do indeed locate Kierkegaard within this tradition, what I think makes 
Kierkegaard distinctive is the way in which he exploits the radical and disturbing 
potential latent within it, namely the way in which it would seem to allow for the 
possibility that the ethical lies outside our comprehension. While still operating in 
philosophical terms, therefore, I do not think that the position I attribute to 
Kierkegaard should lose any of its tendency to unsettle us, as I am sure Kant (for one) 
would have fully recognized. 
 At this point, however, Bristow tries to impose a kind of redundancy objection 
on my account: If my interpretatLRQRI.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSRVLWLRQVKRZVLWWREH
disturbing in the way I have suggested, why prefer it to the radically voluntarist 
DSSURDFKWKDW,UHMHFWDV³UHEDUEDWLYH´ZKHUHWKLVQRZVHHPVQRPRUHGLVWXUELQJIURP
an ethical point of view, as both accounts leave the ethical beyond our rational 
insight, albeit in different ways ± one by positing it as coming from the rationally 
unconstrained will of God, the other from a moral order that transcends our 
understanding?xxiii However, I think this objection fails, as there is still a significant 
difference in the way that these theories put the ethical beyond our rational insight, 
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one by emphasising our cognitive limitations, the other by locating the ethical in what 
to many is then only a kind of arbitrary willing; but while cognitive humility and 
fallibilism can be made compatible with thinking of ethics as comprehensible in itself, 
albeit not necessarily to us, the latter view arguably cannot. 
 Turning finally to the Works of Love, Bristow dislikes the way in which I find 
VRPHNLQGRI³DUJXPHQW´LQWKHWH[WIURPWKHGHPDQGLQJQHVVRIPRUDOLW\WRWKHUROH
of God as lawgiver. His main reason for this is the principle of charity: if we do 
interpret Kierkegaard along the lines I suggest, then it means saddling him with a 
philosophically feeble position.xxiv This is therefore a good point to move from 
GLVFXVVLQJ%ULVWRZ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLYHREMHFWLRQVWRP\YLHZWRKLVSKLORVRSKLFDO
concerns about the sort of position that I attribute to Kierkegaard. 
 
(b) Philosophical objections 
%ULVWRZ¶VPDLQSKLORVRSKLFDOZRUU\DERXWWKHZD\,UHDG.LHUNHJDDUG¶VDFFRXQWRI
obligation, is that his position cannot really compete on philosophical grounds against 
the alternatives I offer on behalf of Kant and Hegel, and so that if we are to give his 
position some dialectical force, we would do better to see him as not engaging in this 
debate at all ± DQGVRDVRSHUDWLQJ³RXWVLGHWKHFLUFOH´RI.DQW+HJHODQGGLYLQH
command theory altogether. But I am not as convinced as Bristow that the position I 
take Kierkegaard to adopt is really as hopeless as he suggests ± though of course, like 
all WKHSRVLWLRQV,GLVFXVVLQWKHERRNWKDWGRHVQ¶WPHDQ,WKLQNLWLVIODZOHVV 
 One worry Bristow has, which we have just discussed, is that the sort of 
intermediate divine command theory I attribute to Kierkegaard is no better off than a 
radical divine command theory, as both allow for the possibility that ethics is beyond 
our rational insight; so insofar as the latter is not a serious competitor to Kant and 
Hegel, so neither is the former. However, as I have already mentioned, I think 
Bristow underestimates the differences between the two views here, where for many 
reasons discussed in the book, the intermediate divine command seems at an 
advantage, even in the transcendent form given it by Kierkegaard. So, leaving this to 
one side, what are the other philosophical flaws that Bristow thinks apply to 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSRVLWLRQDV,XQGHUVWDQGLW" 
 As I discuss in the book, and as Bristow notes, Kierkegaard at least seems to 
offer philosophical arguments in favour of his view by criticising the alternatives of a 
broadly Kantian and Hegelian kind: namely that self-legislation is not really 
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OHJLVODWLRQDQGWKDWDVRFLDOFRPPDQGYLHZFDQQRWJLYHFRQWHQWWRWKH³ZH´WKDWGRHs 
the commanding. However, Bristow thinks that at a philosophical level, Kierkegaard 
cannot really be understood as doing any better, because just like these other 
accounts, a divine command theory cannot really explain what gives God his 
authority to command the law, and hence make it genuinely obligatory (and not 
merely coercive): 
 
How is appeal to God supposed to help, philosophically? Neither Stern nor 
Kierkegaard explains this. Granted the difficulty of rationally validating or 
explaining the authority of moral norms by appeals to self-relations [cf. Kant] 
or social relations [cf. Hegel], the proposal that appeal to God supplies the 
missing rational intelligibility of such authority remains unsatisfying until 
*RG¶VDOOHJHGDXWKRULW\LVLWVHOIUDWLRQDOO\ explained. But what explains or 
MXVWLILHV*RG¶VDOOHJHGDXWKRULW\"$JDLQRQHGRHVQRWILQGHLWKHULQ6WHUQRU
in Kierkegaard) discussion of this question. Without such discussion, how can 
this alleged divine command theory compete with philosophical accounts 
provided by Kant and by Hegel? The absence of any discussion of the 
JURXQGLQJRUOHJLWLPDF\RI*RG¶VDXWKRULW\PDNHVWKHSRVLWLRQMXGJHGIURPD
philosophical point of view, weak and undefended. (Bristow MS: 15-16) 
  
Bristow canvasses one possible response to this worry, which he rejects as 
unsatisfactory: namely, that maybe because it is God we are talking about, then his 
authority requires no defense or rational explanation, because none could be given 
that would make sense to us. He responds, however, by arguing that this would leave 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSRVLWLRQQREHWWHURIIWKDQWKHRQHVKHUHMHFWVDVDOOQRZWXUQRXWWR
have various gaps and lacunae.xxv 
 I agree that this latter strategy would be unsatisfactory. But I think that 
Bristow underestimates the resources available to the intermediate divine command 
WKHRULVWLQWKLQNLQJDERXW*RG¶VDXWKRULW\ZKHUHWKLVWKHRULVWLVDUJXDEO\LQDVWURQJHU
position than the radical divine command theorist on this issue. For the latter, the 
TXHVWLRQRI*RG¶VOHJLWimacy is famously hard to resolve, as Leibniz argued in 
FODLPLQJWKDW3XIHQGRUI¶VSRVLWLRQLVVWXFNLQDFLUFOHIRUXQOHVVWKHUHLVVRPH
normative framework prior to God, how can we claim that he has any legitimate 
authority over us, as to do so we need to be able to say what it is that makes it 
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legitimate and hence wrong to disobey  ± but where the radical divine command 
WKHRULVWSUHFLVHO\UHMHFWVDQ\VXFKIUDPHZRUNSULRUWRWKHH[HUFLVHRI*RG¶V
command.xxvi However, the intermediate divine command theorist is in a different 
position on these issues, for he does allow there to be such a prior framework of the 
right and the good, where the role for God is not to bring such a framework into being 
out of a normative void, but to make it obligatory to do what is right and good, 
because he has so commanded. Not only does this make it easier for such a theorist to 
escape the traditional objections to radical voluntarism; it also makes it easier for him 
to give an account of the legitimate authority of God, and so makes his position a 
more viable alternative to the options represented by Kant and Hegel. 
 In order to see how this could be so, we might take as our account of 
OHJLWLPDWHDXWKRULW\WKHRQHRIIHUHGE\-RVHSK5D]DQGKLVVRFDOOHG³VHUYLFH
FRQFHSWLRQ´DFcording to which authorities are genuine which better enable agents to 
abide by the reasons that they have to act insofar as they exercise that authority and 
DJHQWVDUHOHGE\LW7KLVJLYHVULVHWR5D]¶V³QRUPDOMXVWLILFDWLRQWKHVLV´ 
 
The normal justificDWLRQWKHVLV«FODLPVWKDWWKHQRUPDOZD\WRHVWDEOLVKWKDWD
person has authority over another person involves showing that the alleged 
subject is likely to better comply with reasons which apply to him (other than 
the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged 
authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by 
trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly. (Raz 1986: 53) 
 
Now, if something like this view is accepted, then in fact it can be made pretty 
plausible with respect to God, given his omniscience, infinite goodness and so on ± 
for, if not God, which authority is more likely to meet this criterion for legitimacy in 
the moral case, as able to help us do the things that are right to do in a way that we 
might fail to do if left to our own devices, due to our ignorance of what is for the best, 
to co-RUGLQDWLRQSUREOHPVRXUIDXOW\UHDVRQLQJSRZHUVDQGWKHOLNH",I5D]¶VWKHVLV
applies plausibly to the authority of the state, surely it can be made to apply perhaps 
even more plausibly to God? Of course, such an account will not work for the divine 
command theorist who is a radical voluntarist, as this theorist will not have room for 
any such prior reasons to which the person is being assisted in complying through the 
H[HUFLVHRI*RG¶VDXWKRULW\EXWWKHLQWHUPHGLDWHGLYLQHFRPPDQGWKHRULVW¶VSRVLWLRQ
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is different in precisely allowing for this possibility, and thus being able to work with 
VRPHWKLQJOLNH5D]¶VDFFRXQW1HHGOHVVWRVD\WKLs is not to claim that this account is 
perfect, or that there are no difficulties for the intermediate divine command theorist 
in adopting it ± but it is to suggest that the position is by no means hopeless, and 
perhaps has a good deal more going for it than Bristow seems to envisage. 
 +RZHYHUDVLGHIURPWKLVLVVXHRIOHJLWLPDWLQJ*RG¶VDXWKRULW\%ULVWRZDOVR
WKLQNV.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSRVLWLRQDV,FKDUDFWHULVHLWLVDOVRZHDNLQDVHFRQGZD\
because I take it that he is arguing from the strenuousness of the love command, to the 
UROHRI*RGDVLWVDXWKRUEXW%ULVWRZWKLQNVWKDW.LHUNHJDDUG¶V+HJHOLDQRSSRQHQW
can just deny this strenuousness, and so reject the argument by rejecting this premise 
(cf. Bristow MS: 13-14). Again, however, it seems to me that Bristow may 
XQGHUHVWLPDWH.LHUNHJDDUG¶VUHVRXUFHVKHUH)RUDV.LHUNHJDDUGLVRIFRXUVHYHU\
fond of emphasising, Hegel at least claims to be operating within the context of a 
&KULVWLDQHWKLFVDQGUHSUHVHQWLQJLWV³FRQWHQW´LQDPRUHSKLORVRSKLFDO³IRUP´EXW if 
then Kierkegaard is right to insist that in fact what makes this ethics distinctive, as 
RSSRVHGWRWKDWRIWKH³KRQHVWSDJDQ´LVWKDWLWSUHFLVHO\VHHVWKHORYHFRPPDQGLQ
WKLVGHPDQGLQJZD\WKHQ+HJHO¶VFODLPLVXQGHUPLQHG0RUHRYHUHYHQLIWKH
contemporary Hegelian disavows this connection to the Christian tradition for his 
philosophy, the fact remains that this tradition remains embedded within our secular 
ethical thinking to a significant degree, whereby concerns about the demandingness of 
ethics continue to arisexxvii ± where for many secular ethicists, it still makes sense to 
claim that what is morally asked of us outstrips what we can easily supply. It would 
VHHPWKHUHIRUHWKDWZKLOHRIFRXUVHQRWDOOZLOODFFHSW.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSUHPLVHWKHUH
are still sufficient grounds on which to give it some plausibility, and thus use it as a 
VWDUWLQJSRLQWIRU.LHUNHJDDUG¶VDUJXPHQWDV,HQYLVDJHLW 
 Finally, Bristow also points to a third weakness with a divine command 
WKHRU\DQGWKXVWR.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSRVition seen from this perspective: namely, that 
while this theory may claim that it makes morality more objective and universal, as 
obligation is not then based on variable social factors, nonetheless in fact an ethics 
JURXQGHGLQ*RG¶VFRPPDQGLVQREHWWHU off, as we then have a variety of religious 
claims and creeds to adjudicate, in trying to determine exactly what the content of 
ethics is supposed to be (cf. Bristow MS: 17). Now, I agree with Bristow that this is 
certainly a worry for the divine command theorist, while of course the proponents of 
the view have made various efforts to respond to it ± with varying degrees of success, 
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perhaps.xxviii But when it comes to Kierkegaard, at least, he does seem to have thought 
that non-relativism was a feature of the divine command position, and that this 
GLIILFXOW\RIWKHLUEHLQJGLIIHUHQWJRGVZLWKGLIIHUHQWGHPDQGVZDVQ¶WUHDOO\DVHULRXV
issue. Thus, as he puts it in Works of Love: ³all of us, each one separately, receives 
our orders at one place, if I may put it in this way, and then each one unconditionally 
REH\VWKHVDPHRUGHUV´.LHUNHJDDUG 9:114 (p. 177)). Bristow may be right to 
see this as a philosophical blind-VSRWLQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VDSSURDFKEXWLWGRHVVHHPWR
be a philosophical claim that he was disposed to make, as are contemporary theists 
such as Adams, Evans and others. 
 6RZKLOH,DSSUHFLDWH%ULVWRZ¶VFRQFHUQVDQGZKLOH,WKHUHIRUHDFFHSWWKDW
WKHUHLVDFRQWLQXDOWHPSWDWLRQWRWUHDW.LHUNHJDDUGDVDQ³RXWVLGHU´WRSKLORVRSK\
DQGVRDVD³VFHSWLF´DQLUUDWLRQDOLVWRUDFXOWXUDOFULWLF,KRSHKHUHWRKDYHPDGH
some sort of case for my approach in the book, and the claim I make there: namely, 
WKDW.LHUNHJDDUG¶VUDGLFDOLVPFDQEHSUHVHUYHGHYHQZKLOHZHXQGHUVWDQGKLV
contribution in philosophical terms, and so place him within the dialectical circle that 
I trace, rather than put him outside it as Bristow recommends. 
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i
 I am also extremely grateful to Wayne Martin for putting this symposium together ± 
and indeed for publishing the book in the first place. Thanks are also due to Karen Ng 
and her team for hosting us at the New York German Idealism Workshop, and to the 
excellent audience at that occasion. 
ii
 ³7KHSUREOHPZLWK6WHUQ¶VDUJXPHQWDV,VHHLWLVWKDWLWFKDQJHVWKHWHUms of what 
Kant has in mind when he poses the fundamental problem of the bindingness of 
morality. In the passage from Groundwork III just cited, Kant invokes the distinction 
between the two realms as part of an argument intended to show that we have 
(reasonable) grounds (based on the spontaneity of thought tied up with cognition) for 
taking ourselves to have the requisite freedom required by autonomy, which itself is 
required if action in accordance with the categorical imperative is even possible. If we 
reFDOOWKHVWUXFWXUHRI.DQW¶VH[WHQGHGDUJXPHQWFXOPLQDWLQJLQKLVDSSHDOWR
transcendental idealism in the final section of the Groundwork, it is apparent that the 
distinction between the holy and finite imperfect will could not resolve the 
fundamental issue of moral obligation that Kant is attempting to answer, because the 
GLVWLQFWLRQLVQRWLQWHQGHGRUDGHTXDWHDVDUHSO\WRWKHH[DFW³KRZSRVVLEOH´
questiRQZLWKZKLFK.DQWLVFRQFHUQHG´%D[OH\06-8). 
iii
 I am grateful to Jens Timmermann for discussion of these passages. 
iv
 Actually, I think the argument is a little more complex than that, but will stick to 
this more standard way of presenting it for now. For my somewhat different account 
of the argument of elimination, see Stern forthcoming b. 
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v
 The translation of the first clause of the second sentence is modified. 
vi
 The interpretation sketched here is elaborated further in Stern forthcoming b. 
vii
 This is an option that I do briefly discuss in Understanding Moral Obligation, 
though not directly in relation to Hegel: see Stern 2012: 155. As Wayne Martin has 
suggested to me, if the thesis of my book is right, that none of the theories of 
obligation canvassed there are satisfactory, and that these exhaust the options, then 
dropping the notion of moral obligation may be the logical next step. Of course, for 
different reasons (because we live in a secular culture, and so can no longer treat God 
as a lawgiver), Anscombe thought something similar, and suggested Greek virtue 
ethics as an alternative approach; but whether the Greeks themselves managed 
without some notion of duty is itself a contested matter (cf. Stern 2012: 151), so what 
ethics would look like that had no such concept remains unclear. 
viii
 &I0R\DU06³7KLVGRHVUDLVHWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUWKHtension [between 
realism and autonomy], and thus the constructivist argument, reappears in full force if 
+HJHOLVVHHQDVUHWDLQLQJDOHJDOLVWLFFRPPDQGDFFRXQWRIOHJLVODWLRQ´ 
ix
 6HHIRUH[DPSOH+HJHO5S³7KHULJKWRIWKHVXEMHFW¶V
particularity to find satisfaction, or ± to put it differently ± the right of subjective 
freedom, is the pivotal and focal point in the difference between antiquity and the 
modern DJH«%XWDEVWUDFWUHIOHFtion fixes this moment in its difference from and 
opposition to the universal, and so produces a view of morality as a perennial and 
hostLOHVWUXJJOHDJDLQVWRQH¶VRZQsatisfactions, DVLQWKHLQMXQFWLRQµ'RZLWK
UHSXJQDQFHZKDWGXW\FRPPDQGV¶´ 
x
 &I0R\DU06QRWH³,IZHPRYHIURP.DQWLDQVHOI-command to social 
command, and from the moral law to positive law, then there is the pressure to go 
FRQVWUXFWLYLVWWKDW3LSSLQH[SORLWV´ 
xi
 For the emptiness objection to constructivism, see Stern 2012: 13. 
xii
 At one point, Moyar mentions this issue in relation to Fichte, commenting that 
³>F@RQVFLHQFHLVWKHDEVROXWHFHUWDLQW\that an action is my duty, but conscience itself 
LVQRWDQHSLVWHPLFFDSDFLW\´0R\DU06%XW,DPQRWVXUH,XQGHUVWDQGWKH
distinction being drawn here; and anyway, I would argue that HegeO¶VIRFXVVHHPVWR
EHHSLVWHPLFHYHQLI)LFKWH¶VZDVQ¶W" 
xiii
 0R\DUKLPVHOIDGPLWVWKLVSDVVDJHLVSUREOHPDWLFQRWLQJWKDW³7KLVLV«WKHNLQGRI
comment that Hegel makes to indicate the typical thought about a certain concept, a 
thought that later turns out to be one-VLGHG´0R\DU06 
xiv
 Cf. Hegel 1821: §138R and §138A, pp. 166-7: ³When the existing world of 
freedom has become unfaithful to the better will, this will no longer finds itself in the 
duties recognized in this world and must seek to recover in ideal inwardness alone 
WKDWKDUPRQ\ZKLFKLWKDVORVWLQDFWXDOLW\«2QO\LQDJHVZKHQWKHDFWXDOZRUOGLV
hollow, spiritless, and unsettled existence [Existenz] may the individual be permitted 
to flee from actuality and retreat into his inner life. Socrates made his appearance at 
the time when Athenian democracy had fallen into ruin. He evaporated the existing 
world and retreated into himself in search of the right and the good´ 
 37 
                                                                                                                                                                      
xv
 Mill 1863: 246. 
xvi
 Note that judging an action is blameworthy is not the same as judging that I am to 
EODPHDQGKHQFHQHHGQRWLQYROYH³WKHNLQGRIVHOI-accusing judgement that is often 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKFRQVFLHQFH´0R\DU06DVLVREYLRXVZKHQ,MXGJHWKDW,DP
obliged not to I insofar I-LQJLVEODPHZRUWK\DQGGRQ¶WGRVRDs a result, where then 
no self-DFFXVDWLRQZRXOGEHDSSURSULDWH6RWRWKDWH[WHQWWKHIDFWWKDW+HJHOGRHVQ¶W
WDONPXFKRIWKH³EDGFRQVFLHQFH´LQWKLVVHQVHRIDFWXDOVHOI-accusation hardly shows 
WKDWKHGLGQ¶WWKLQNRIFRQVFLHQFHDVUHODWLQJWRFRQVLGHrations of reproach by self and 
others (cf. Moyar MS: note 11). 
xvii
 &I35S³WKHHWKLFDOVSKHUHLV«DFLUFOHRIQHFHVVLW\ZKRVHPRPHQWV
are the ethical powers ZKLFKJRYHUQWKHOLYHVRILQGLYLGXDOV´ 
xviii
 This is how Knox translates it, for example. See Hegel 1821b: 157. The relevant 
*HUPDQWHUPVDUH³UHFKWOLFK´DQG³VLWWOLFK´ 
xix
 Moyar seems to be working with the same false-GLFKRWRP\ZKHQKHZULWHV³+HJHO
lamented the modern sickness of thinking that you yourself are the exclusive source 
of obligatiRQ+HJHO¶VFXUHZDVQRWWRFHGHWKHDXWKRULW\WRWKH6WDWHEXWWRDUJXHIRU
co-UHVSRQVLELOLW\RIWKHVXEMHFWDQGRWKHUV´0R\DU06)URPZKDW,KDYHVDLG,
KRSHLWFOHDUWKDWWKLVLGHDRI³FR-UHVSRQVLELOLW\´FDQDFWXDOO\EHDIHDWXUHRIWKHVRFLDO
command model. 
xx
 MS, p. 31. 
xxi
 Cf. Kant 1793: 6:99 note: ³[I]f an alleged divine statutory law is opposed to a 
positive civil law not in itself immoral, then is there cause to consider the alleged 
divine law as spurious, for it contradicts a clear duty, whereas that it is itself a divine 
command can never be certified sufficiently on empirical evidence to warrant 
violating on its account DQRWKHUZLVHHVWDEOLVKHGGXW\´ 
xxii
 Cf. the passage from Works of Love that I cite in the book (Stern 2012: 223, note 
³%ut you shall love God in unconditional obedience, eve if what he requires of 
\RXPLJKWVHHPWR\RXWREH\RXURZQKDUPLQGHHGKDUPIXOWRKLVFDXVHIRU*RG¶V
ZLVGRPLVEH\RQGDOOFRPSDULVRQZLWK\RXUVDQG*RG¶VJRYHUQDQFHKDVQRREOLJDWLRQ
of responsibiOLW\WR\RXUVDJDFLW\´.LHUNHJDDUGS 
xxiii
 Cf. Bristow MS: 10-11, and 4. 
xxiv
 ³,IZHUHDG.LHUNHJDDUG¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIDXWKRULW\LQWorks of Love as advancing 
philosophical arguments in a philosophical dialectic, then the position is weak and 
undefended. If, instead, we read Kierkegaard in these passages, not as engaged with a 
philosophical dialectic with Kant and Hegel, offering a divine command theory as 
making the most rational sense of our moral obligations, but instead, as addressing 
professing Christians upon the ground of Christian presuppositions, the force of 
KierNHJDDUG¶VSDVVDJHVLVUHVWRUHG´%ULVWRZ06 
xxv
 In a footnote (Bristow MS: 16, note 5) he also raises the suggestion that the 
OHJLWLPDF\RI*RG¶VDXWKRULW\FRPHVVLPSO\IURPhis coercive power, where he 
wonders if perhaps this is what I meant in saying that Kierkegaard foreshadows 
$QVFRPEH¶VYLHZWKDWOHJLVODWLRQUHTXLUHV³VXSHULRUSRZHULQWKHOHJLVODWRU´%XW,
 38 
                                                                                                                                                                      
take it here that Anscombe and Kierkegaard are claiming that such superior power is a 
necessary condition for legislation, not a sufficient one ± a condition which they think 
that Kantian self-legislation does not meet, as the self cannot exercise genuine power 
over itself. So again, I would agree with Bristow that on its own, this cannot amount 
to an answer to the request for legitimation of that power. 
xxvi
 Cf. Leibniz 1706: §V, pp. 73-4:  
Nor do I see how the author [Pufendorf], acute as he is, could easily be 
absolved of the contradiction into which he falls, when he makes all juridical 
REOLJDWLRQVGHULYDWLYHIURPWKHFRPPDQGRIDVXSHULRU«ZKLOH«KH>DOVR@
states that in order that one have a superior it is necessary that they [superiors] 
possess not only the force [necessary] to exercise coercion, but also that they 
have a just cause to justify their power over my person. Consequently the 
justice of the cause is antecedent to this same superior, contrary to what had 
been asserted. Well, then, if the source of law is the will of a superior and, 
inversely, a justifying cause of law is necessary in order to have a superior, a 
circle is created, than which none was ever more manifest. For what will the 
justice of the cause derive, if there is not yet a superior, from whom, 
supposedly, the law may emanate? 
These issues are discussed further in Stern forthcoming a. 
xxvii
 See, for example, debates about the demandingness of utilitarianism; cf. Mulgan 
2001. 
xxviii
 See, for example, Adams 1999: 262-70. 
